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Abstract
Nowadays hi-tech secure products need more services and more security. Furthermore
the corresponding market is now oriented towards more flexibility. In this thesis we
propose as novel solution a Multi-algorithm Cryptographic Co-processor called Celator.
Celator is able to encrypt or decrypt data blocks using private key encryption algo-
rithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1] or Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [2]. Moreover Celator allows condensing data using the Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA) [3]. These algorithms are frequently implemented in hi-tech secure products in
software or in hardware mode. Celator belongs to the class of the flexible hardware
implementations, and allows an user implementing its own cryptographic algorithm
under specific conditions.
Celator architecture is based on a 4x4 Processing Elements (PE) systolic array, a
Controller with a Finite State Machine (FSM) and a local memory. Data are encrypted
or decrypted by the PE array.
This thesis presents Celator architecture, as well as its AES, DES, and SHA ba-
sic operations. Celator performances are then given and compared to other security
circuits.
xiii
xiv
1
Introduction
The trend of the hi-tech secure products market is to offer more services and more
security to users. More services and security require flexible functions. It can happen
that an electronic device needs to execute further algorithms than those it was designed
for; therefore such devices must be flexible and reconfigurable.
Our challenge is to implement a multi-algorithm Crypto-Co-Processor, called Cela-
tor. Celator is conceived to be integrated in an ASIC for embedded circuits with Atmel
Standard Cells. More precisely, Celator can be included in Smart Cards and in Smart
Card Readers.
By using simple logic and arithmetic operations, Celator can perform the following
algorithms:
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128, AES-196 and AES-256), [1]
• Data Encryption Standard (DES), [2]
• Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA-256), [3]
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The adopted solution for Celator is based on a 4x4 Processing Elements (PE)
systolic array, which seems a good solution to compute all matrix format data. PE
array’s data path is reconfigurable, just as the Finite State Machine which controls
the PE array is too. Because of these two reconfigurable elements, Celator can be
reconfigured. Results show that Celator is a good trade off with respect to the execution
cycles, to the area and to the flexibility, between a dedicated hardware macro, and a
multi-purpose processor.
This thesis presents my published works [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] and the contribution
of [10].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 presents a brief history
of the security techniques. Section 1.2 introduces the Celator work environment. In
section 1.3 several side channel attacks are disclosed. Some conclusions of this chapter
are given in section 1.4.
1.1 Security and insecurity
1.1.1 From Herodotus to cryptographic processors
Cryptography, deriving from Greek “krypto´s” hidden, and the verb “gra´fo” write, is
the study of message secrecy.
Encryption attempts to ensure secrecy in communications, such as those of spies,
military leaders, and diplomats, but it has also had religious applications. For instance,
early Christians used cryptography to obfuscate some aspects of their religious writings
to avoid the near certain persecution.
Before the modern era, cryptography was concerned solely with message confiden-
tiality (i.e. encryption). In recent decades, the field has expanded beyond confiden-
tiality concerns to include techniques for message integrity checking, sender/receiver
identity authentication, digital signatures, interactive proofs, and secure computation,
amongst others.
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The earliest forms of secret writing required little more than local pen and paper
analogs, as most people could not read. More literacy, or opponent literacy, required
actual cryptography. The main classical cipher types were transposition ciphers and
substitution ciphers, which systematically replace letters or groups of letters with other
letters or groups of letters. An early substitution cipher was the Caesar cipher, in which
each letter in the plaintext was replaced by a letter some fixed number of positions
further down the alphabet. It was named after Julius Caesar who is reported to
have used it, with a shift of 3, to communicate with his generals during his military
campaigns.
Steganography (i.e. hiding even the existence of a message so as to keep it confi-
dential) was also first developed in ancient times. An early example, from Herodotus,
concealed a message – a tattoo on a slave’s shaved head – under the regrown hair.
More modern examples of steganography include the use of invisible ink, microdots,
and digital watermarks to conceal information.
Various physical devices and aids have been used to assist with ciphers. One of
the earliest may have been the scytale of ancient Greece [11], the cipher grille in
medieval times, the Alberti’s own cipher disk for the polyalphabetic ciphers (circa
1460), the Johannes Trithemius’ tabula recta scheme, and Thomas Jefferson’s multi-
cylinder (invented independently by Bazeries around 1900). Early in the 20th century,
several mechanical encryption/decryption devices were invented, and many patented,
including rotor machines – most famously the Enigma machine used by Germany in
World War (WW) II [12].
The development of digital computers and electronics after WWII made possible
much more complex ciphers. Today digital computers allows a large use of the cryp-
tography not only for government necessity but also for secrecy in ordinary communi-
cations, e-commerce secure transaction, trusted ID etc.
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1.1.2 The Evaluation Assurance Level
A standard security measure for cryptographic algorithms or for their hardware and
software implementations does not exist yet. Nevertheless, there are some criteria to
evaluate their security level.
One of these criteria is the evaluation of the difficulty to break a given crypto-
graphic algorithm, with respect to a well-known mathematical problem. Id est, the
security level of many cryptographic algorithms can be associated to the difficulty of
certain computational problems, such as the integer factoring problem or the discrete
logarithms in a finite field problem [13, chapter 11]. There are proofs that crypto-
graphic techniques are secure if a certain computational problem cannot be solved
efficiently [14]. These proofs are contingent, and thus not definitive, but are currently
the best available for cryptographic algorithms and protocols. Example given, as the
main operation in RSA based algorithms is the modular exponentiation in GF(2n),
thus the security level of RSA based algorithms is associated to the discrete logarithms
in a finite field problem.
Since 1999 the international standards for security evaluation are defined by the
Common Criteria [15] as Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL1 through EAL7) of an
Information Technology product or system [16]. The EAL is a numerical grade assigned
following the completion of a Common Criteria security evaluation. The increasing
assurance levels reflect added assurance requirements that must be met to achieve
Common Criteria certification. The intent of the higher levels is to provide higher
confidence that the system’s principal security features are reliably implemented. The
EAL level does not measure the security of the system itself; it simply states at what
level the system was tested to see if it meets all the requirements of its Security Target.
The Security Target is a document that describes the assets to protect in the system,
the threats that are identified on these assets, and the security objectives that are to be
achieved by the system security. Then, it describes the system security by listing the
security requirements, that are written using the Common Criteria restricted syntax.
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A Security Target is generally written to be compliant to a Protection Profile. The PP
is a document, typically created by a user or user community, which identifies security
requirements relevant to that user for a particular purpose. A PP effectively defines a
class of security devices; for example, Smart Cards used to provide digital signatures,
or network firewalls.
A PP is associated to a product, and it is dedicated to a particular EAL.
EAL5+ has become the standard in the SC business, with the PP called SC IC
Platform Protection Profile, under the reference BSI-PP-0002 [17]. The EAL5+ pro-
vides more security confidence than the EAL5 does, but less than the EAL6 does.
The BSI-PP-0002 specifies the security target for SC. The perimeter of the Target Of
Evaluation (TOE) can be one or more assets to be protected, and one or more threats.
For instance, perimeter of the BSI-PP-0002 can be the protection:
• of the user data (asset)
• from the fault injection attack that would try to divulge or modify the asset
(threat)
To achieve a particular EAL, the computer system must meet specific assurance
requirements. Most of these requirements involve design documentation, design analy-
sis, functional testing, or penetration testing. The higher EALs involve more detailed
documentation, analysis, and testing than the lower ones. Achieving a higher EAL
certification generally costs more money and takes more time than achieving a lower
one. The EAL number assigned to a certified system indicates that the system com-
pleted all requirements for that level. A higher EAL means nothing more, or less, than
the evaluation completed a more stringent set of quality assurance requirements. It
is often assumed that a system that achieves a higher EAL will provide its security
features more reliably, but there is little or no published evidence to support that as-
sumption. The required third-party analysis and testing performed by security experts
is reasonably evidence in this direction. An evaluation example of an operating system
is presented in [18].
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In 2006, the US Government Accountability Office published (Figure 1.1) a re-
port on Common Criteria evaluations that summarized a range of costs and schedules
reported for evaluations performed at levels EAL2 through EAL4.
Figure 1.1 – Range of completion times and costs for Common Criteria eval-
uations at EAL2 through EAL4. Source [19]
Receiving a particular EAL takes a lot of time and a lot of money. Celator has not
been evaluated by the Common Criteria yet. A next step of the research shall achieve
this evaluation.
1.2 From the Smart-Cards to the secure products
1.2.1 Smart Cards
A Smart Card (SC) is defined as a pocket-sized card with embedded integrated circuits
which can process information. This implies that the SC can receive input which is
processed – by way of the SC applications – and delivered as an output. There are two
broad categories of SC:
• Memory SC: they contain only non-volatile memory storage components, and
some specific security logic. First generation of SC were typically memory SC.
6
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They can offer a light security.
• Microprocessor based SC: they contain microprocessor, memory medium (volatile
and/or non volatile) and other peripheral components (net-card, sound card etc.).
This kind of SC offer a stronger security than memory SC.
The microprocessor based SC are used to ensure confidentiality and information
integrity, for private data like bank transitions. Therefore the cards need to be pro-
tected, and be robust to attacks. Several security levels must be reached, from the
support protection to the card protection, from the embedded operating system to the
applications that run on them (see section 1.3).
Even if the SC was invented at the beginning of the seventies (first patent about
SC was granted to the German scientist Helmut Gro¨ttrup and Ju¨rgen Dethloff [20] in
1972, and to the French inventor Roland Moreno [21] in 1974), the first mass use of
the cards was pre-payed cards for French public phones, starting in 1983 (Te´le´carte).
The major boom in SC use came in the nineteens in Europe, with the introduction
of the smart-card-based SIM used in Global System for Mobile communication (GSM)
mobile phone equipments. With the ubiquity of mobile phones in Europe, SC have
become very common.
1.2.2 A secure Environment
Smart cards have a small gold chip measuring about 1cm by 1cm on the front (Fig-
ure 1.2). When inserted into a reader, the chip makes contact with electrical connectors
that can read information from the chip and write information back.
The ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 7810 series of standards define:
• the positions and shapes of the electrical connectors
• the electrical characteristics
• the communication protocols
7
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• the format of the commands sent to the card and the responses returned by the
card
• robustness of the card
• the functionality
Figure 1.2 – Smart Card overview. Each Smart Card has 8 Input/Output pins.
The cards do not contain batteries; energy is supplied by the card reader. SC Read-
ers are used as a communication bridge between the SC and a host, e.g. a computer,
a Point Of Sale (POS) terminal, or a mobile telephone.
Most advanced SC are equipped with dedicated cryptographic hardware. Today’s
cryptographic SC are also able to generate key pairs on board, to avoid the risk of
having more than one copy of the key. The reconfigurable cryptographic coprocessor
we present here can be included in a SC, and the user will be able to select among
several cryptographic algorithms.
Such SC are mainly used for digital signature and secure identification trough au-
thentication mechanism. The most widely used cryptographic algorithms in SC (ex-
cluding the GSM so-called crypto algorithm) are Data Encryption Standard (DES),
or its improved version 3DES (Triple DES), and RSA. The key set is usually loaded
(for DES) or generated (for RSA) on the card at the personalization stage. Even if
nowadays the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is preferred to the DES based
algorithms because of its stronger security, both AES and DES based algorithms are
8
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largely used in many IT products, e.g. in e-passports. Another common algorithm in
IT products is the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), used to sign a clear or encrypted
message. Our cryptographic coprocessor will be able to perform AES, DES and SHA.
1.2.3 The Smart Cards market trend
The hardware and software architecture for a SC depends on its targets, which are
strictly correlated to the SC market. There are four main SC markets (Figure 1.3):
1. radio-mobile telephony (Figure 1.4)
2. banking (Figure 1.6)
3. multimedia (TV on demand, satellite etc., Figure 1.7)
4. ID (e-passports, health cards etc., Figure 1.8)
Figure 1.3 – Example of SC uses: radio-mobile telephony, multimedia ID
etc . . .
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Figure 1.4 – Sim cards. They include a Smart Card
In Europe, all GSM, Global Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Universal Mobile
Telecommunication System (UMTS) mobile phones are equipped with a SIM card
(Figure 1.4). It is required to secure the identification process of of phone service
users. The SIM cards are sold to the users by the phone operators, and can offer many
services to the customers, e.g. they allow to access to the Internet. The radio-mobile
telephony market is big. It started in the nineties but now it is almost saturated,
especially in Europe: almost everyone owns a mobile phone, which is equipped with a
SIM card, and does not change it very often ([22], Figure 1.5)! In this way, the current
European radio-mobile telephony market is powered by people who buy a new mobile
line, loose its mobile phone with the SIM card etc.
Figure 1.5 – Growth in the number of mobile telephone subscribers world-
wide, 2005–2006.
Mobile manufacturers usually do not appreciate SC, typically because they do not
produce SC, and also because they consider the SIM cards like an hardware intrusion
10
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of the phone operators in their mobile devices.
Figure 1.6 – Credit cards. They include a Smart Card
The international payment brands Europay, MasterCard and Visa (EMV) agreed
in 1993 to work together to develop the specifications for the SC in payment cards used
as either a debit or a credit card with the EMV. For the banks interested in introducing
SC in credit cards (Figure 1.6), the only quantifiable benefit is the ability to forecast a
significant reduction in fraud, in particular counterfeit, loss and stealing. The current
level of fraud experienced by a country determines if there is a business case for the
financial institutions.
Figure 1.7 – Te´le´vision Par Satellite cards. They include a Smart Card
The development of the multimedia market relies on the diffusion of the satellite
TV decoders, and the services like the TV on demand (Figure 1.7). The banking and
multimedia markets are smaller than the radio-mobile telephony one. Nevertheless,
a banking dedicated SC is typically more expensive (high added value SC) than a
radio-mobile telephony one, because the banking identifying process requires more
sophisticated security levels.
The ID market is a new market and its expansion is in progress everywhere. Indeed,
SC are also being introduced in personal identification and entitlement schemes at
regional, national, and international levels. Citizen cards, drivers’ licenses, and patient
card schemes are becoming more prevalent, and contactless SC are being integrated
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into biometric passports to enhance security for international travels. These markets
are currently growing. In France, a leader country in developing and using the SC, the
Carte Vitale (Figure 1.8) includes a SC which secures the identification of patients.
Next generation of this health card will also store the history of cares and the details
of the last medicines taken by the card owner.
Figure 1.8 – A French Carte Vitale. It includes a Smart Card
1.2.4 Smart Card Readers
A Smart Card Reader reads the data off a SC. SC Readers are used as a communication
device between the SC and a host, e.g. a Personal Computer link SC Reader, a POS
terminal, an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) or a mobile telephone (Figure 1.9).
Celator can be included in a SC Reader.
In order to check and ensure the customer identity and authenticity, a SC Reader
can ask the user to enter its Personal Identification Number (PIN), and then performs
one or more cryptographic algorithms. The algorithms to be used depend on the service
required by the user. For instance, the AES can be used to encrypt a message, while
the SHA can be used to sign a message. Of course, a SC Reader that is able to execute
several cryptographic algorithms, can offer more services to users than mono algorithm
ones.
1.3 Side channel attacks
Using some cryptographic algorithms can not be enough to ensure the identification
and the access to confidential data like bank account, because SC and SC Readers can
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Figure 1.9 – Celator can be included in a SC Reader like a PC link SC reader
(a), an ATM (b), a POS (c), a mobile phone (d)
leak information if they are not protected from attacks. They have to be preserved
against attacks.
Several kinds of attacks exist:
1. social attacks against the people who develop or use the SC
2. static physical attacks (power is not supplied)
3. dynamic physical attacks (power is supplied)
4. passive logical attacks (the hacker tries to obtain information from encrypted
data)
5. active logical attacks (the hacker is able to manipulate encrypted data)
These kinds of attacks cannot be achieved at once. Several studies, hardware and
software developments at different levels are required as countermeasures. We will
detail the above type 3 attack, and more particularly the side channel attack.
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In cryptography, a side channel attack is any attack based on information gained
from the physical implementation of a crypto-system, rather than theoretical weak-
nesses in the algorithms, which is the aim of cryptanalysis. For instance, examples of
side channel attacks are the following ones:
• timing analysis attack based on the measure of the time execution for certain
arithmetic or logical operations;
• power analysis attack based on the power analysis during the execution of a given
algorithm;
• TEMPEST (also known as van Eck) attack based on the analysis of the Electro-
Magnetic radiation emissions;
• acoustic analysis based on the measures of the noise emitted by the SC during a
given operation.
In all cases, the underlying principle is that physical effects caused by some op-
erations of a crypto-system (on the side) can provide useful extra information about
secrets in the system, for example, the cryptographic key, partial state information,
full or partial plaintexts and so forth.
Next sections will detail the various side channel attacks.
1.3.1 Timing analysis
A timing attack watches I/O data movement of the CPU and of the memory, while
one algorithm is running. Simply by observing how long it takes to transfer key infor-
mation, it is sometimes possible to determine how long the key is. Internal operational
stages in many cipher implementations provide information (typically partial) about
the plaintext, key values and so on, and some of this information can be inferred from
observed timings. Alternatively, a timing attack may simply watch for the time a
cryptographic algorithm requires.
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One of possible countermeasure is to employ the same time to perform all supported
algorithms. For instance, the encryption and the decryption must have the same ex-
ecution time. If one operation is faster than the other one, some random operations
which do not modify the final result (masking data as shown in [23], no-operations
etc.) can be added.
1.3.2 Power dissipation analysis: SPA, DPA
A power monitoring attack can provide similar information by observing the power lines
to the hardware, especially the CPU. As with a timing attack, considerable information
is inferable for some algorithm implementations under some circumstances.
Among these attacks, first to be developed was the Simple Power Analysis (SPA).
The current power samples are analysed in order to obtain information. The following
operations are considered as leaks and can be attacked by SPA:
• writing “1” or “0” into the storage mediums (RAM, ROM, registers etc.): the
transition current from the p-plan to the n-plan (and vice versa) of CMOS tran-
sistors are different, therefore writing an “1” is different than writing a “0”;
• comparing data value stored in memory (e.g. in the conditional branching) can
cause a variation of the power consumption;
• the execution of certain operations like the power elevation, in which there is an
high correlation between the time during (and then the power consumption) of
the operation itself and the power exponent.
In 1999 the SPA attacks could be performed easily and they cost 400$ only, as it is
detailed in [24].
Another power analysis based attack more efficient than the SPA is the Differential
Power Analysis (DPA) attack, which works even on small signals [25]. In order to
perform a DPA, first an attacker must be able to precisely measure the power con-
sumption. Second, the attacker needs to know what algorithm is computed, and third
15
Chapter 1
an attacker needs the plaintexts or ciphertexts. The strategy of the attacker is to make
a lot of measurements, and then divide them with the aid of some oracle into two or
more different sets. Then, statistical methods are used to verify the oracle. If and only
if the oracle was right, one can see noticeable peaks in the statistics.
A direct countermeasure against SPA and DPA is to parallelize all computations.
In this way the electrical noise produced can make the power analysis stronger to be
performed. The coprocessor’s architecture we present here allows to parallelize the
computations. Furthermore, Atmel technology we used, allows to secure write “1” and
“0” into the memory. Therefore we will consider the writing operations as trusted ones.
1.3.3 Electromagnetic analysis
As a fundamental and inevitable fact of electrical life, current fluctuations generate
radio waves, which are the currents subject – at least in principle – to a TEMPEST or
van Eck attack. If the currents concerned are patterned in distinguishable ways, which
is typically the case, the radiation can be recorded and used to infer information about
the operation of the associated hardware.
If the relevant currents are those associated with a display device (i.e. highly
patterned and intended to produce human readable images), the task is greatly eased.
Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) displays use substantial currents to steer their electron
beams and they have been ’snooped’ in real time with minimum cost hardware from
considerable distances (hundreds of meters have been demonstrated). Liquid Crystal
Displays (LCDs) require and use smaller currents and are less vulnerable than CRT
displays – which is not to say they are invulnerable.
As we said in the previous section, a parallel architecture allows a good protec-
tion even against TEMPEST attack, because the computing data are dispatched in
several components working concurrently. Celator can exploit this protection against
TEMPEST attack thanks to its parallel structure.
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1.3.4 Acoustic analysis
As an inescapable fact of electrical life in actual circuits, flowing currents heat the
materials through which they flow. These materials also continually transmit heat to
the environment due to other equally fundamental facts of thermodynamic existence, so
there is a continually changing thermally induced mechanical stress as a result of these
heating and cooling effects. That stress appears to be the most significant contributor
to low level acoustic (i.e. noise) emissions from operating CPUs. Recent research by
Shamir et al. [26] has demonstrated that information about the operation of crypto-
systems and algorithms can be obtained in this way by the so-called acoustic attack.
This kind of attack is easy to perform hardware machines which include big CPU and
hard disk.
1.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented how the security techniques have changed from old
Greeks to nowadays. Smart cards are used to secure confidential data, ensure the
privacy, provide the authenticity and the integrity of an information message. SC and
SC Readers include cryptographic algorithms. Moreover they have to be side channel
attack resistant.
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. The Chapter 2 describes some al-
gorithms implemented in Celator, i.e. AES, DES and SHA. The state of the art of
the hardware and software cryptographic implementations is disclosed in Chapter 3.
The Celator hardware architecture is detailed in Chapter 4. The Celator software
programming is shown in Chapter 5. Finally some conclusions are given in Chapter 6.
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2Three cryptographic
algorithms
This Chapter briefly introduces three algorithms that have been implemented into
Celator: the AES, the DES and the SHA. The reader can find the complete description
of them in [1, 2, 3]. The AES, the DES and the SHA are presented in sections 2.1, 2.2
and 2.3, respectively.
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Table 2.1 – The 4x4 byte matrix for an AES-128 data block.
d11 d12 d13 d14
d21 d22 d23 d24
d31 d32 d33 d34
d41 d42 d43 d44
2.1 The AES algorithm
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) [1] approved cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect
electronic data. The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt or
decrypt information. The AES algorithm is capable of using cryptographic keys of 128,
192 and 256 bits. These different versions are called AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256
respectively, and all versions can be performed by Celator. In this work, we focus
on the AES-128. The plain text consists of 128-bit data blocks. Each block can be
managed as a matrix of 4x4 bytes (Table 2.1).
The AES encryption process includes 10 rounds. Each round (excepting the first
one and the last one) involves the following transformations:
1. Sub-Bytes transformation
2. Shift-Rows transformation
3. Mix-Columns transformation
4. Add-Round-Key transformation
Sub-bytes transformation A round of AES starts with the Sub-Bytes transforma-
tion (Figure 2.1). All data of the array are substituted by using Sbox tables [1].
Shift-Rows transformation The second transformation of a round is the Shift-
Rows (Figure 2.2): each row of the matrix is left shifted by 1, 2, or 3 positions respec-
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Figure 2.1 – S-Box transformation
tively for row 1, 2 or 3.
Figure 2.2 – Shift-Rows transformation. This transformation cyclically shifts the
last three rows in the state S(x).
Mix-Columns transformation After the Shift-Rows, the following AES transfor-
mation to be executed is the Mix-Columns (Figure 2.3). This transformation linearly
combines all the data in each whole column. More precisely, 4 vectors are applied to
linearly transform the 4 columns. Celator must perform the following matrix multipli-
cation:
S ′(x) = A(x) ∗ S(x) (2.1)
with
A(x) =

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02
 (2.2)
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Figure 2.3 – Mix-Columns transformation. This transformation operates on the
state column-by-column.
where S(x) is the present state of the data, and A(x) is the matrix made of multiplica-
tive vectors, as it is explained in [1, pag. 18].

S
′
0,c
S
′
1,c
S
′
2,c
S
′
3,c
 =

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02
 •

S0,c
S1,c
S2,c
S3,c
 for 0 ≤ c < 4 (2.3)
Celator could perform the Mix-Columns transformation in two ways. In the first
one, the logarithmic tables [27] and some lookup tables are used; in the second way,
the xtime function is used [1].
Mix-Columns with lookup tables. Assume that a and b are two bytes from
the state matrix and multiplicative vectors matrix, respectively. The equation (2.1)
can be transformed in an addition by using the following logarithmic property:
c = a ∗ b (2.4)
That is equivalent to:
c = log−1 [(log a) + (log b)] (2.5)
where log(a) or log(b) means a lookup from a logarithmic table (see [27]), providing
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the power representation of a and b. Then log(a) + log(b) should be modulated by 255.
Another lookup, from the inverse logarithmic table, is needed to obtain the polynomial
basis representation of the result c, which is a byte from the next state matrix.
For each byte of the state matrix S(x), Celator uses the logarithm properties in
order to perform (2.5) under the Sequencer control.
Mix-Columns with xtime function. In order to compute the multiplication
(2.1), each byte of the state (i.e. S(x)) is multiplied by the polynomial vector (i.e.
A(x), as described in [1]) by the xtime and xor functions.
In section 5.1.1 we will detail the adopted choice for the Mix-Columns transforma-
tion, and its implementation in Celator based on the xtime function.
Add-Round-Key transformation The last transformation Add-Round-Key of the
encryption round combines the key values Wt related to the current round, with the
present state S of the data through an exclusive XOR (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4 – Add-Round-Key transformation. This transformation xors each col-
umn of the state with a word from the key schedule.
2.2 The DES algorithm
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm was developed at International Busi-
ness Machine Corporation (IBM), as a modification of an earlier system known as
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LUCIFER. DES was first published in the US Federal Register in 1975. After a con-
siderable amount of public discussion, DES was adopted by the NIST as a standard
in 1977, and has become one of the most widely used cryptosystem in the world [2].
Nowadays DES is still very used, especially the enhanced DES, so-called 3DES.
DES is a block cipher which operates on plaintext 64-bit blocks and returns cipher-
text blocks of the same size, using a key which is a bitstring of length 56 bits. The
3DES operates on plaintext 64-bit blocks using a 168-bit key.
The algorithm proceeds in three stages (Figure 2.5a):
1. Given a plaintext x, the bitstring x0 is constructed by permuting the bits of x
according to a (fixed) Initial Permutation (IP). We write x0 = IP(x) = L0R0
where L0 comprises the MSB 32 bits of x0 and R0 the LSB 32 bits:
x0 = {MSB(x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
, LSB(x0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
} (2.6)
2. for i = 1 to 16
Li = Ri−1
Ri = LI ⊕ f(Ri−1, Ki)
(2.7)
where ⊕ denotes the exclusive-or of two bitstrings. f is a function that we will
describe later, and K1, K1 . . .K16 are each bitstrings of length 48 computed as a
function of the key Ki.
3. Apply the inverse permutation IP−1 to the bitstring R16L16 obtaining the ci-
phertext y. That is, y = IP−1(R16L16). Note the inverted order of R16 and
L16.
The f function is depicted in Figure 2.5b. Basically, it consists of
• the E expansion, from 32 to 48 bits, using the E table (Table 2.2).
• the xoring with a 48-bit key word
• the substitution using an S-box
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Figure 2.5 – DES algorithm. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
(a) Enciphering
computation (b) f function
• the permutation P
Figure 2.6 illustrates the DES key schedule:
1. The 56-bit key K is expansed to 64-bits by adding 8 zeros. Then the 64-bit key K
is permuted according to the permutation PC1. We will write PC1(K) = C0D0,
where C0 comprises the MSB 28 bits of PC1(K) and DO the LSB 28 bits.
2. for i = 1 to 16
Ci = LSi(Ci−1)
Di = LSi(Di−1)
(2.8)
and Ki = PC2(CiDi). LSi represents a cyclic shift (to the left) of either one or
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Table 2.2 – E function. The first three bits of E(R) are the bits of R in positions 32,
1 and 2 respectively, while the last 2 bits of E(R) are the bits of R in positions
32 and 1 respectively.
E bit-selection table
32 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 6 7 8 9
8 9 10 11 12 13
12 13 14 15 16 17
16 17 18 19 20 21
20 21 22 23 24 25
24 25 26 27 28 29
28 29 30 31 32 1
two positions, depending on the value of i: shift one position if i = 1, 2, 9 or 16,
and shift two positions otherwise. PC2 is another fixed permutation.
Figure 2.6 – Calculation of f(R,K). Source: Wikimedia Commons.
To resume the DES operations, in order to execute DES, Celator must perform the
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xor and shift operation, the E expansion as well as the following permutations: IP
(Table 2.3), IP−1, P, PC1, PC2. All expansion and permutation tables are given in
annexes C.1.
Table 2.3 – Initial Permutation. The permuted input has bit 58 of the input as its
first bit, bit 50 as its second bit, and so on to bit 7 as its last bit.
IP
58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4
62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8
57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
Unlike AES transformations, DES permutations are bitwise permutations and thus
their execution in Celator requires more time than a byte permutation. Their imple-
mentation in Celator, which work on 32-bit wide words, shows how Celator can also
perform bit format data operations.
2.3 The SHA
The SHA-1 and the SHA-2 (i.e. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512) are four secure hash
algorithms specified by [3]. These algorithms are iterative, one-way hash functions that
can process a message to produce a condensed representation called a message digest.
Each algorithm can be described in two steps: preprocessing and hash computation.
Preprocessing involves padding a message, parsing the padded message into m-bit
blocks (m= 512 for SHA-1 and SHA-256, m= 1024 for SHA-384 and SHA-512), and
setting initialization values to be used in the hash computation. The hash computation
generates a message schedule from the padded message and uses that schedule, along
27
Chapter 2
with functions, constants, and word operations to iteratively generate a series of hash
values. The final hash value generated by the hash computation is used to determine
the message digest. In this work, we focus on the SHA-256.
From [3], eight 32-bit intermediate variables (a, b, c, . . . , g, h) are required by
SHA. These variables are initialized by eight 32-bit constants given by the standard
(H1, H2, . . . , H8).
The required steps to apply the SHA to a 512-bit message are the following ones:
• for j = 16 to 63
– Wj = σ1(Wj−2) +Wj−7 + σ0(Wj−15) +Wj−16
• for j = 0 . . . 63
– h⇐ g
– g ⇐ f
– f ⇐ e
– e⇐ d+ T1
– d⇐ c
– c⇐ b
– b⇐ a
– a⇐ T1 + T2
– T1 ⇐ h+ Σ1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) +Kj +Wj
– T2 ⇐ Σ0(a) +Maj(a, b, c)
– Ch⇐ (a and b) xor ((not a) and c)
– Maj ⇐ (a and b) xor (a and c) xor (b and c)
– Σ0(x) = ROTR
2(x) xor ROTR13(x) xor ROTR22(x)
– Σ1(x) = ROTR
6(x) xor ROTR11(x) xor ROTR25(x)
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– σ0(x) = ROTR
7(x) xor ROTR18(x) xor SHR3(x)
– σ1(x) = ROTR
17(x) xor ROTR19(x) xor SHR10(x)
• The result is HN = (Hn1, Hn2, . . . , Hn8), i.e. :
– H1 ⇐ a+H1
– H2 ⇐ b+H2
– . . .
– H8 ⇐ h+H8
2.4 Conclusions
Three algorithms have been presented: the AES, the DES and the SHA. Celator must
be able to execute these three algorithms. The AES is a ciphertext that can encrypt
and decrypt a 128-bit data block. The AES data format is the byte. The DES is a
ciphertext that can encrypt and decrypt a 64-bit data block. The DES data format is
the bit. The SHA is a hashing function that can hash a 512 data block, resulting in to
a 256-bit digest. The SHA data format is 32-bits.
This list of already-implemented algorithms is not closed. Given the reconfigurable
architecture of Celator (chapter 4), Celator can be reconfigured in order to perform
more algorithms. Before detailing in chapter 5 the implementation and the execution
of these algorithms in Celator, we will draw up the state of the art in chapter 3 and
we will describe the Celator architecture in chapter 4.
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Hardware and software
implementations of
cryptographic algorithms:
state of the art
Cryptographic algorithms can be performed on General Purpose Processors (GPP), or
on hardware special purpose devices, like hardwired macros. GPP usually have lower
performances than hardwired macros, but GPP are 100% reconfigurable. Hardwired
macros give higher performances than GPP, but unlike GPP the hardwired macros are
not reconfigurable.
Next sections present several implementations of cryptographic algorithms by GPP
(section 3.1) and by hardwired macros(section 3.2).
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3.1 General Purpose Processors
Hereafter three reconfigurable cryptographic coprocessors, are presented. We will con-
sider the AES as the benchmark algorithm. Some of the techniques presented in these
sections can be viewed in Celator, too.
3.1.1 The NEC DRP
The systolic technology described in [28] allows to parallelize the computations and
shows a way to easily reconfigure such Dynamically Reconfigurable Processor (DRP,
Figure 3.1). The DRP enables switching among different encryption algorithms.
The DRP core is a two dimensional array, and it is made of:
• Several Processing Elements (PE) arranged in a systolic fashion. A PE is able to
receive instructions and compute data. A PE is made of:
– an Arithmetic and Logic Unit (ALU)
– several registers (including a register file)
• A State Transition Controller (STC) which contains the control programs
• Vertically and Horizontally Memory units (VMEM and HMEM)
Before performing a computation, all data paths and control programs have to be
saved. In order to save them, a C-language code is used: first it has to be compiled,
then synthesized and downloaded into the DPR.
This systolic architecture seems to be well suited to parallel compute matrix format
data. In Celator we will also see that several processing elements work simultaneously
to parallelize some operations. Nevertheless in Celator, contrarily to the DRP archi-
tecture, a dedicated instruction set is defined, in order to avoid the timing loss of the
C compilation phase.
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Figure 3.1 – The DRP architecture. The DRP is made of several Processing Ele-
ments, a State Transition Controller and several memory blocks.
3.1.2 The Crow FPGA Implementation
The flexibility and high speed capability of FPGAs make the hardware accelerators a
suitable platform for cryptographic applications, as it is shown in [29]. Crow et al. built
a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) coprocessor to perform the AES in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode [30], the SHA-512 [3] and a Modular Exponentiation
(ME).
The FPGA cryptographic co-processor includes a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) mem-
ory block, a Static RAM (SRAM), a memory control block, an AES block, a SHA
block and a ME block (Figure 3.2). Data are stored in the FIFO. The SHA input data
are stored in FIFO1, the AES input data are stored in FIFO2. The AES output data
are stored in FIFO3, which is linked to the FIFO1 via an I/O buffer. In this way,
after encrypting data by the AES module, data can be signed by the SHA module.
The memory control block manages data transfers and provide commands to the AES,
SHA and ME blocks which perform the crypto operations.
This co-processor was tested on Xilinx VirtexII-pro FPGA. The SHA is achieved
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Figure 3.2 – An FPGA cryptographic co-processor
with a throughput of 570 Mbps when operated at 20 MHz; the SHA block requires 2304
CLB slices. The AES execution is performed with a throughput of 468 Mbps when
operated at 40 MHz (there is a multi-clock environment); the AES block requires 2688
CLB slices. For the ME block, the throughput is 51.84
#Expon.bits
Mbps when operated at
50 MHz; the ME block requires 8064 CLB slices large.
The performances of the combined architecture are impressive. Nevertheless, its
implementation requires a big amount of CLB slices.
3.1.3 The Zippy Project
Enzler et al. present the Zippy design methodology in [31]. Zippy’s mission is to
develop reconfigurable processor for the domain of handled and wearable computing.
Figure 3.3 shows the body computing system. Enzler et al. built a so called autonomous
Wearable Unit with Reconfigurable Modules (WURM). Each WURM node consists of
a CPU, a FPGA based reconfigurable hardware unit, memory, a set of I/O interfaces
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that connect sensors and actors, and a wireless interface for communications with other
WURM nodes (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.3 – The body area computing system for wearable computers
While the CPU is configured into the FPGA at power-on, the hardware tasks
are dynamically configured on demand. For instance, when the WURM receives a
compressed audio stream for playback, the CPU recognizes the encoding format in use
and initiates the dynamic configuration of suitable audio decoding coprocessor into the
reconfigurable hardware unit. When the audio coprocessor is in place, it receives the
encoded audio stream from the CPU. The audio coprocessor decodes the audio stream
and sends the raw audio data for playback to the digital-to-analog converter.
Figure 3.4 – WURM hardware architecture
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Results show how the reconfigurable hardware unit computes runtime intensive
functions more efficiently than the CPU. Runtime functions are found in applications
from cryptography, multimedia and communication. Enzler et al. did not report
WURM’s performances and size for encrypting or decrypting functions. Nevertheless,
they state that the WURM’s soft CPU core requires 3865 Virtex slices, which is 41%
of the FPGA resources, and 14 dedicated block RAM, which equals 50% of the FPGA
memory resources. The CPU runs at 25MHz (Figure 3.5 shows the overhead of the
WURM).
Figure 3.5 – Block diagram of the WURM prototyping platform
In our opinion the WURM solution can require too many area resources for embed-
ded systems. Moreover, as we said in the previous section, the FPGA based solutions
require many FPGA resources for connections. Therefore, our reconfigurable crypto
co-processor will not include any FPGA technology, even if one of our goals is to
implement a multi-algorithm circuit.
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3.2 Hardwired macros
Hereafter eight cryptographic hardwired macros are detailed. These macros are dedi-
cated to AES, DES and SHA.
3.2.1 The Sharma macro
In [32] a systolic architecture is used for constructing high-speed AES special-purpose
devices, which includes a computer memory and a processing element array. Data flow
from the computer memory in a rhythmic fashion, passing through several processing
elements before it returns to memory. The architecture has improved the hardware
complexity and the rate of encryption/decryption. Similarities of encryption and de-
cryption are used to provide a high level of performance while keeping the chip size
small.
The four AES transformations are achieved in the following way:
1. The Sub-Bytes transformation is performed by ASIC AES boxes (Figure 3.6).
With few connections, the same Galois Field (28) inverter can be used both in
encryption and decryption.
2. In Shift-Rows transformation no separate design have been implemented. Data
are shifted by using registers R0–R5.
3. In Mix-Columns transformation systolic architecture is used for matrix-matrix
multiplication of the 4x4 array. In each processing element a combinational logic
is used for multiplication in GF(28) and for addition. Moreover, each cell has
one register which contains the values required by the encryption and decryption
process and one register is used to store the computation result.
4. In Add-Round-Key transformation, a combination of XOR gates is used.
The implementation of this hardware systolic architecture requires 40 clock cycles
to perform an AES encryption for 128-bits, with a theoretical throughput of 3.2 bit
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Figure 3.6 – Design for AES Data Unit
per cycle (the authors did not provide the test clock frequency). Considering that an
AES round includes 4 transformations and that a round is repeated 10 times for an
encryption, each transformation is performed in one clock cycle only. This is a high
performance result.
The drawback of these macros is the non reconfigurability: they are able to
perform an algorithm only, i.e. the AES. Nevertheless, their systolic architecture seems
to be a good idea to encrypt/decrypt matrix format data. Our solution shall improve
this idea in order to obtain a reprogrammable and multi-algorithms integrated circuit
to compute matrix format data.
3.2.2 The G-Plus AES implementation
In [33] a special purpose architecture which performs the whole AES encryption in 1
clock cycle only is patented. Its implementation requires a maximum parallel encryp-
tion module (Figure 3.7).
High throughput is achieved, even when the AES algorithm is employed with one
of the feedback operation modes [30]. Hardware is provided for one encryption round,
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Figure 3.7 – The G-plus AES implementation
which is re-used as needed to complete the encryption process. This allows feedback
modes to be used without adversely affecting AES throughput.
The controller is part of a hierarchical distributed control scheme comprising some
Finite State Machines (FSMs). It controls the operation of the encryption and key
scheduling modules such that one round of the AES algorithm is completed per clock
cycle.
The main advantage of this solution is the possibility to encrypt/decrypt on the
fly, which is useful in products dedicated to the multimedia market. A drawback of
this solution is the big amount of logic gates, which can be difficult to implement in
embedded systems. Furthermore, as in the device described previously [32], this circuit
is not reconfigurable.
3.2.3 The Trichina Coprocessor
In [23] an immune to first order DPA AES coprocessor is described. Masking all input
and intermediate data values appears to be useful to decorrelate any information leaked
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through Side Channels Attacks (SCA). This countermeasure is one of the most powerful
countermeasures against SCA [34], [35].
The data masking idea is simple: the message and the key are masked with some
random values at the beginning of the computation process, and thereafter everything
is almost as usual. Of course, the value of the mask at the end of some fixed steps must
be known in oder to re-establish the expected data value at the end of the execution.
A traditional XOR operation is used for data masking. The operation is compatible
with the AES structure except for the inversion in Sub-Bytes, which is the only non-
linear transformation. Trichina et al. show how to manipulate masked data. They
build a masked multiplier in GF(2n) from standard multipliers, and they achieve the
Sub-Bytes transformation by a Masked S-box.
Results show that this architecture is able to secure encrypt an AES data block with
a throughput of 4 Mbps when operated at 5 MHz. The total gate count for the circuit
is 16K. By a simple multiplication, we can estimate that the encryption is achieved
in 16 rounds only. In our solution, we shall adopt the masking data as one possible
countermeasure.
3.2.4 The Eli Biham DES implementation
In [36] a DES implementation is presented by Eli Biham. Its solution uses a 64-bit
processors as SIMD parallel computer which can compute a 64-bit operations simul-
taneously. It achieves speeds of about 137 Mbps to encrypt a 64-bit data block. The
DES operations are executed as follows:
• XOR operation: the XOR operation of the processor computes 64 one-bit XORs;
• expansion and permutations: these operations do not cost any operation, since
instead of changing the order of words, the required word can be addressed di-
rectly by only changing the naming of the registers;
• S-box operation: the S-boxes are computed by their logical gate circuit, using
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XOR, AND, OR and NOT operations. Typically they are represented in about
100 gates.
This implementation is attractive to ciphers that manipulate bit format data block,
whose operations are simple (no multiplication for example, except the trivial one with
factor 2), use only small S-boxes (thus their gate complexity is small), or use small
register sizes. With difficulty Celator can be a Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD)
processor. A Multiple Instruction, Multiple Data (MIMD) processor would be more
suitable to ensure many possible computations. The dedicated S-boxes seem to be a
good solution to speed up these substitutions. Unfortunately, dedicated S-boxes can
be exploited by one algorithm only. Thus, we will try to develop a generic look up
table for every kind of substitutions in Celator.
3.2.5 The Saqib implementation of DES
In [37] an efficient and compact DES architecture especially designed for reconfig-
urable hardware platforms is detailed. This DES implementation makes use of an
eight DES S-Boxes parallel structure (Figure 3.8), resulting in a significant reduction
of the critical path for encryption/decryption. Its DES round design achieves a data
encryption/decryption rate of 274 Mbps.
DES makes use of 8 S-Boxes (each of 64x4) occupying a total of 2 Kbits. This
relatively small amount of memory is implemented by using the distributed memory
resources in FPGAs. Fixed permutations in fact occupy a low percentage of FPGA
interconnection lines because they are hardwired.
FPGA implementation of DES algorithm was accomplished on a VirtexE device
XCV400e-8-bg560. The design achieves a frequency of 68.05 MHz. It takes 16 clock
cycles to encrypt one data block (64-bits). Therefore, the achieved throughput is
274 Mbps.
Reconfigurable devices are attractive since the time and costs of VLSI design and
manufacturing can be reduced. The S-Boxes can be stored in a dedicated memory,
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Figure 3.8 – DES Algorithm implemented on a FPGA
but including a memory per S-box is expensive in terms of area. We will see how in
Celator two look up tables can be accessed concurrently by using a double port memory
to store the S-boxes, and how the execution time can be saved.
3.2.6 The Ahmad hardware implementation of SHA
In [38] an architecture to implement the hash algorithms of the secure hash standards
SHA-256 on Altera FPGA is explored. A ROM is used to store the SHA initial hash
value. A high throughput is achieved 335 Mbps. Multi-operand adders are implemented
by carry save adders (CSAs), referred to as redundant adders but which are faster and
have a smaller area than Carry look-ahead Adders (CLAs).
3.2.7 The Chavez hardware implementations of SHA
The hardware implementations of SHA-256 can be improved by the techniques pre-
sented in [39]. The most relevant techniques are:
• parallel counters or well balanced Carry Save Adders, in order to improve the
partial additions;
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• techniques (see below the example of the SHA variable computation) that opti-
mize the data dependency, and parallelize operations;
• improved addition units;
• embedded memories to store the required constant variables.
In this way, the SHA is executed in 65 cycles (i.e. one cycle per SHA round) with a
throughput of 1.4 Gbps.
The usage of SHA, CSA would not be so beneficial in Celator, because among
the PE (its reconfigurable devices) there is a dedicated connection paths for addition.
Embedded memories can speed up all data transfers between registers and we shall use
this technique.
Parallelizing computations is difficult in the SHA-256, because the data dependency
is very complex. Nonetheless, SHA algorithm can be divided into two parts: the
variables B, C, D, F, G, and H (section 5.3.1) are obtained directly from the variables
of the round, without any computation, while the variables A and E require some
computations, and depend on all other SHA variables. Thus the computations of all
SHA variables can be split in two stages: a stage to get the values of B, C, D, F, G,
and H, and a stage to get the values of A and E.
We will see how Celator split the computations of the SHA variables in two stages,
too.
3.2.8 The Cadence Hashing Algorithm Generator SHA-256
Cadence implemented an hardware SHA-256 [40] suitable for use in random number
generators. High speed operation with throughput at low gate count were achieved:
• 133 MHz operation at 0.18 µm CMOS technology
• 2100 NAND-2 equivalent ports
• 971 Mbps throughput
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Hardwired macros like this has the advantage of a high performances, but is not
reconfigurable. Unlike Celator shall be.
3.3 Conclusions
We have seen the hardware and software implementations of AES, DES and SHA
algorithms. We can resume the following statements:
• The systolic architectures seem to be well suited for parallel compute matrix
format data [28].
• The performances of the combined architecture are impressive. Nevertheless, its
implementation requires a big amount of CLB slices [29].
• FPGA based solutions require many FPGA resources for connections [31].
• The hardwired macros are not reconfigurable.
• The hardwired macros can achieve a high bit-rate, and they can encrypt/decrypt
on the fly, which is useful in products dedicated to the multimedia market [33].
• Masking data can be an useful countermeasure against SCA [23].
• The dedicated S-boxes speed up a software implementation [36].
• The time and costs of VLSI design and fabrication can be reduced on reconfig-
urable devices [37].
• In SHA the data dependency is very complex, therefore parallelizing computa-
tions is difficult [39].
The reconfigurability grows up from a hardwired implementation (0% reconfig-
urable) to an implementation on GPP (100% reconfigurable), while the throughput
and the area decrease. For us, the good trade off choice is a solution “in the middle”.
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In this way, the developed Celator has a x degree of reconfigurability comprised be-
tween 0% and 100%, faster than GPP and smaller than hardwired macros. In next
chapter the Celator architecture is disclosed.
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Proposing a reconfigurable
cryptographic coprocessor:
Celator
This chapter describes the hardware implementation of Celator processor.
Our challenge is to make Celator reconfigurable. If you do a Google search for
“reconfigurable processor” you find more than 40000 results including FPGA technolo-
gies (Avril 2008). But FPGA based solutions are not adequate to implement Celator
because:
• too many FPGA resources are needed for connections; the embedded FPGA can
be another solution, and this technique is currently under study
• too many time is lost in compilation time when the FPGA cards are reconfigured;
the dynamically configurable FPGA can be another solution, but again, to many
area is required to interface the FPGA card with other devices.
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Therefore we aimed to find a reconfigurable technology without FPGA cards. We
found the solution in a systolic processor based on a Proposing Element array. In Cela-
tor, the data-path of the PE array can be reconfigured at each clock cycle. Therefore
Celator is a reconfigurable processor.
The AES operates on 8-bit data word, while the DES operates on 1-bit data word,
and the SHA operates on 32-bit data word. In this way we show that Celator can
efficiently operate on 8-bit, 1-bit and 32-bit data words.
Three cryptographic algorithms have been implemented on Celator. Therefore Cela-
tor is also a cryptographic multi-algorithm processor.
Section 4.1 shows the computer system that Celator is conceived for. Celator archi-
tecture is detailed in section 4.2. Finally, in section 4.3 some considerations are given
about the choices we made in Celator hardware development.
4.1 The system: CPU, Memory, peripherals, bus
Celator is designed to be integrated in a computer system which includes at least the
following devices:
• a Main processor or CPU
• a RAM
• Celator
• an Interface (IF) unit
• Other peripherals (i.e. Parallel Input/Output (PIO), buses, Direct Memory Ac-
cess (DMA) controller, net-card, etc..)
A Smart Card or a Card Reader are an example of such a computer system (Fig-
ure 4.1). In the validation system the CPU is the ARM 7 TDMI core (Figure 4.2, [41]).
The CPU will be the master of both the bus and the Main Memory.
There are 2 buses: the Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) and the Advanced
Peripheral Bus (APB). The first works at a higher frequency than the second one.
Celator will be linked to the CPU and to the RAM via the AHB and via the IF unit.
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Figure 4.1 – Smart Card architecture. Celator can be included in a SC
Figure 4.2 – The ARM 7 TDMI architecture
The IF unit manages the AHB (section 4.2.5) in order to let the CPU communicate
to Celator, and vice-versa. For instance, the CPU can program Celator to encrypt a
data block. When the encryption is achieved, Celator communicates the results to the
CPU.
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4.2 Celator hardware architecture
This section details the hardware development of Celator and the architecture of the
whole computer system around Celator. The whole computer system (Figure 4.3)
includes the ARM 7 TDMI core, a Main Memory, the IF unit, Celator and the AHB.
Celator includes a PE array, a Controller and the Celator Memory called CRAM.
Celator can have a different clock from the CPU, and the IF unit allows Celator and
the CPU to communicate even when they work at a different frequency. These modules
are detailed in next sections.
Figure 4.3 – Whole computer system architecture
4.2.1 The Processing Element Array
The PE array is the data path of Celator, and consists of a systolic array of 4x4 Process-
ing Elements. All PE are identical. The PE array is controlled by the Controller (sec-
tion 4.2.3). Systolic array processors [42] can have mono-dimensional, two-dimensional
or three-dimensional I/O connections. The 3D I/O connections need more area than
1D I/O. For Celator we chose the 2D I/O, which seems to be a good trade off with
respect to the connection (Figure 4.4) and allows Celator to execute several algorithms.
Thus, by the 2D I/O, the whole PE array has (Figure 4.5):
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Figure 4.4 – Three types of I/O connections
(a) 1D
I/O
(b) 2D
I/O
(c) 3D
I/O
• four 32-bit data inputs/outputs, i.e. one per cardinal direction;
• four multiplexers (MUX N, MUX E, MUX W, MUX S) which the input/output
of the PE array allow to be switched among: North, East, West and South
input/outputs. The multiplexers can also make PE array linked in a toric fashion,
which can be useful to perform operations such as rotations around the PE array
(Figures 4.5 and 4.6).
All PE array multiplexers are configured by the Controller, and the configuration
can be modified at each clock cycle. Therefore, the PE array data path is reconfigurable.
4.2.2 The Processing Element – Confidential
This section is Atmel confidential.
4.2.3 The Controller – Confidential
This section is Atmel confidential.
4.2.4 CRAM
The Celator RAM, or CRAM, can store 32-bit data and instruction words (Figure 4.7).
Data include the encrypting or decrypting input/output data, as well as all data needed
by the encrypting/decrypting process, e.g. the Sbox for the AES. Programs stored in
CRAM include the micro-instructions for the Controller. The CRAM is a double port
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Figure 4.5 – The architecture of the Processing Element array
RAM, therefore both CPU and Controller can access to the CRAM in read/write mode.
The CRAM that we use is 4KB large, 32-bit word size and its area is 1 mm2 with Atmel
CMOS 130 nm technology.
4.2.5 The Interface unit
The Interface (IF) unit links the CPU and Celator via the AHB bus. It lets the CPU
communicate with Celator. The AHB is made of the following buses:
HADDR : 32-bit input address bus
HWRITE : 1-bit input write enable signal
HSEL RAM : 1-bit input RAM select signal. Celator includes a RAM (section 4.2.4),
and this signal enables the writing and the reading operations into the Celator
RAM.
HSEL REG : 1-bit input register select signal. The IF includes several registers, and
this signal enables the writing and reading into the IF unit registers
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Figure 4.6 – Details of the 1st column of the PE Array
Figure 4.7 – The CRAM architecture. It is a double port RAM.
HWDATA : 32-bit output data bus
HRDATA : 32-bit input data bus
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The IF unit includes (Figure 4.8):
• Control register: used by the CPU to start and reset Celator (2 bits)
• Status register: used by Celator to indicate to the CPU that the current algorithm
is done (1 bit)
• Interrupt register: to indicate the CPU when the current algorithm is done (1
bit)
• Split-Address (S-A) register: the S-A register can be written by the CPU only,
and stores a RAM address. This address is comprised between 0 and the
CRAM highest address (1023), that we call Max CRAM Address. The S-A reg-
ister value is used to disable the CPU writing mode into the CRAM: the CPU
may write into the CRAM addresses comprised between the S-A value and the
Max CRAM Address, only. For instance, before filling the CRAM with a program,
the CPU sets the S-A value to 0. Before starting Celator, the CPU can set the
S-A value to Max CRAM Address - 16 bytes. If so, the CPU may write into the
last 16 bytes of the CRAM only: that memory space can be used as data buffer
between Celator and the CPU. In this way, no malicious applications can write
into CRAM, and modify the program (or data) stored at the address comprised
between 0 and in the Max CRAM Address. The S-A size is 12 bits.
Both Control and Status registers are set-reset registers (Figure 4.9). These registers
allow the communication between 2 devices (i.e. CPU and Celator), even if these
devices work at different frequencies. For each bit of a such set-reset register, 4 Flip-
Flops with asynchronous clear and one “or” logic port are needed.
The communication between CPU and Celator works in the following way. Let the
Control register have the following structure:
• LSB (i.e. bit number “0”): reset signal
• MSB (i.e. bit number “1”): start signal
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Figure 4.8 – Interface unit.
In order to reset Celator, the CPU has to write 01b into the Control register. In order
to start Celator, the CPU has to write 10b into the Control register.
Consider one bit of the Control register, e.g. the start signal. Four flip-flops (FF)
and one or logic gate are needed to transmit the start information. Let in 1 and out
1 be the start I/O with the CPU. Let f1 be the CPU frequency. Let in 2 and out
2 be the start I/O with Celator. Let f2 be the Celator frequency. In this way, when
the CPU starts Celator, in 1, D0 and D3 are set to 1. After 1 clock cycle of f1, D1 is
set to 1; in 1 switches from 1 to 0, D0 and D3 hold 1. The set information (start) is
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Figure 4.9 – Architecture of the set-reset register.
ready to pass from f1 world to f2 world (D1 is sampled on f2). In the meanwhile, D3
is also set to 1. By now:
• after 1 clock cycle of f1, Q3 and out 1 are set to 1. The CPU knows that Celator
is receiving the start signal
• after 1 clock cycle of f2, Q1 and out 2 are set to 1. Celator receives the start
signal
Once Celator is started, Celator sets in 2 to 1. After 1 clock cycle of f2, Q2 is set
to 1, and Q0 is asynchronously reset. D1, D0, and D3 are immediately set to 0. The
reset information (start) is ready to pass from f2 world to f1 world (D3 is sampled on
f1) By now:
• after 1 clock cycle of f2, Q1 and out 2 are set to 0. Celator knows that the CPU
is knowing that Celator started
• after 1 clock cycle of f1, Q3 and out 1 pass from 1 to 0. The CPU knows that
Celator started
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In this way, the CPU frequency modules are decoupled from Celator, which can
work at a different frequency.
4.3 Considerations about Celator hardware architecture
The adopted solution Celator is based on a 4x4 Processing Element (PE) systolic array
[42], which seems a good solution to compute all matrix format data.
PE array’s data path is reconfigurable, just as the Finite State Machine which
controls the PE array is, too. Because of these two reconfigurable elements, Celator
can be reconfigured. Results show that Celator is a good trade off with respect to the
execution cycles, between a dedicated hardware macro and a general purpose processor.
The CRAM stores the instructions for the FSM, and the user data.
The PE array is the Celator operating center. It is made of 4x4 1 byte PEs, which
can operate arithmetic and logic computations on 8-bit data words. In order to operate
on data words larger than 8-bits, more PE must be concatenated each others.
Three algorithms have been implemented into Celator: AES [1], DES [2] and SHA
[3]. In the next sections we show how Celator may be programmed in order to execute
these algorithms.
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Validating Celator on FPGA
Before developing the ASIC, Celator was prototyped and validated on FPGA. In this
way, Celator was developed in Verilog Hardware Description Language (Verilog HDL)
at the Register Transfer Level (RTL). Therefore Celator was prototyped by Mentor
Precision RTL (synthesis) and Xilinx ISE (place and route) and validated on a Xilinx
Virtex XC2V3000 FPGA. We used the Atmel Voyager Platform (Figure 5.1) which
include the FPGA card and an external memory, the SRAM. Simulations were executed
by means of the ARM Developer Suite (ADS).
Two images were encrypted, decrypted and signed by Celator: Lena color image
(Figure 5.2a) and the Penguin gray image (Figure 5.2b).
The Celator test on FPGA requires several hardware components and software ap-
plications. These components include the CPU (ARM 7 TDMI), the Interrupt Control
(IC), Celator and the Interface (IF). The algorithm to be tested, for instance the AES,
must be written first in Celator software instructions, and then the Celator software
instructions must be coded in hexadecimal format, according to the instruction types
shown in section 4.2.3. In order to automatize the assembler to hexadecimal format
translation, we developed a C program called celator_compiler. This program is
called by the following command:
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Figure 5.1 – The Atmel Voyager Platform used to prototype Celator. The
Xilinx Virtex XC2V3000 FPGA (1) and an external SRAM (2) are included
in Atmel Voyager Platform.
/> celator_compiler src_file dst_file
For the AES Celator dedicated code, see annexes B.2. For the celator_compiler
source C code, see annexes A.1.
The FPGA hardware implementation is performed in the following way (Figure 5.3):
1. Celator, IF, CPU and IC Verilog codes (RTL) are synthesized by Mentor Precision
RTL for the Xilinx Virtex XC2V3000 FPGA
2. the synthesis netlist is placed and routed by Xilinx ISE
3. a bit-file is generated by Xilinx ISE
4. the bit-file is downloaded into the Virtex XC2V3000 FPGA by Xilinx Impact
software
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Figure 5.2 – AES encrypting a colour image in ECB and CBC modes
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3 – The Celator FPGA implementation steps
The Celator software programming is performed in the following way (Figure 5.4):
1. the AES is written in Celator assembler dedicated format
2. the assembler format file is translated into hexadecimal format file by
celator_compiler. Each instruction is coded as a 32-bit word
3. each 32-bit word is written into ARM assembler format file, the ARM DCD
constants
4. a scatter file is used to map the AES instructions (in DCD format) into the
SRAM
5. all ARM assembler files are compiled by ADS
6. an object file is generated and downloaded into the FPGA
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Figure 5.4 – The Celator software programming steps
The assembler files compiled by ADS include the AES instructions in DCD format,
and also other files that let Celator work, e.g. the IC handler, a vector table, a test
image etcetera; for more details, see annexes B.4. Data and program words are stored
by the ADS into the SRAM, at the addresses specified in the scatter file.
After the hardware and the software set up, Celator can be controlled by the IF
registers. The ADS allows to write/read into all memory space. Thus, Celator can
be manually reseted and started. The CPU resets Celator, fills the CRAM with AES
instructions and data (Figure 5.5), then starts the AES. A software C function, called
CFunction, was programmed to execute an algorithm on Celator (annexes B.3).
For instance, in order to encrypt (AES) an image stored in the SRAM, the
CFunction does the following:
1. copy 128-bit data block from the image in the SRAM into the CRAM;
2. write the CRAM address of the encrypting program (e.g. 0h10) at the address 0
of the CRAM;
3. start the AES encryption; once the AES finished;
4. copy the AES output 128-bit data block from the CRAM to the SRAM;
5. copy a new 128 bit block from the image in the SRAM into the CRAM;
6. allow to start the AES encryption, and go to 1.
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Figure 5.5 – The CRAM. In this example, the CRAM is filled with the AES instruc-
tions and data by the CPU.
If the Celator user would decrypt a block data instead of encrypt it, he can use the
same above CFunction by simply modifying the value that the CFunction stores at
address 0 of the CRAM. Celator directly jumps to the address written at the address
0 of the CRAM. Thus, to execute an AES decrypting, the CFunction has to write the
address of the AES decrypting instructions (e.g. 0h120) at address 0 of the CRAM
(Figure 5.5). To execute the AES key schedule, the CFunction has to write the address
of the AES key schedule (e.g. 0h010) at address 0 of the CRAM.
A whole encrypting/decrypting cycle schema is shown in Figure 5.6.
After the Celator hardware and software set up, the CPU starts Celator by writing
the start signal into the IF Control register (section 4.2.5). Then Celator works au-
tonomously. In order to compute an algorithm, the instructions stored in the CRAM
are fetched by the FSM and then are executed by the PE array. When an algorithm
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Figure 5.6 – An encrypting/decrypting cycle schema
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is achieved, Celator transfers the results into the CRAM and generates an interrupt
dedicated to the CPU.
Next sections will detail how Celator can be programmed in order to perform AES
(section 5.1), DES (section 5.2) and SHA (section 5.3).
5.1 AES
An AES data block is made of 128-bits. In Celator data are computed by the 4x4 PE
array and each PE works on 8-bit data. Each element of the data matrix (Figure 5.7a)
can be mapped into a Processing Element device (Figure 5.7b). As a consequence,
each byte to be encrypted or to be decrypted is mapped into a single PE, and each
AES transformation can be mapped into the 4x4 PE array.
In Figure 5.7a the data block is arranged in a 4x4 matrix, just like the 4x4 PE array
does in Figure 5.7b.
Celator can perform all 4 AES transformations that are required by AES encryption,
decryption and key scheduling. The Controller can execute a whole AES by combining
these transformations.
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Figure 5.7 – Data Mapping to a PE array.
(a) The 4x4 byte data ma-
trix for an AES data
block.
d11 d12 d13 d14
d21 d22 d23 d24
d31 d32 d33 d34
d41 d42 d43 d44
(b) The 4x4 8-bit PE array
of Celator.
PE11 PE12 PE13 PE14
PE21 PE22 PE23 PE24
PE31 PE32 PE33 PE34
PE41 PE42 PE43 PE44
5.1.1 Implementation of the AES into a PE Array – Confidential
This section is Atmel confidential.
5.1.2 FPGA results
Celator is able to encrypt and decrypt an AES data block both in Electronic Codebook
(ECB, Figure 5.8) mode and in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC, Figure 5.9) mode [30].
The Celator dedicate assembler code for AES is annexed (section B). Figures 5.10
show the difference between encrypting a gray scale image (Figure 5.10a) in ECB
(Figure 5.10b) and CBC (Figure 5.10c) modes.
Figure 5.8 – Electronic Codebook (ECB) encryption mode
In ECB mode, the plain image is first cut in several 128-bit data blocks separately, and
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then the blocks are independently encrypted. If the input data blocks of the encrypting
process have the same values, i.e. if there are some repeated pixels in the image, then
the output data blocks of the encrypting process will be the same, i.e. several pixels
will have the same values, since the keys are the same for all data blocks. That is why
we can identify the penguin’s profile in Figure 5.10b.
Figure 5.9 – Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption mode
In CBC mode, the plain image is first cut in several 128-bit data blocks and, unlike
the ECB mode, each block is xored with the previous encrypted data block, and then
each block is encrypted (first data block of the picture is xored with an initialisation
vector). In this way, all output data blocks are different, and the output image is
unrecognizable (Figure 5.10c).
Figure 5.10 – AES encrypting a gray scale image in ECB and CBC modes
(a) (b) (c)
Again, Figures 5.11 show difference between encrypting the colour image of Lena in
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ECB and CBC modes. Like for the penguin, Lena in ECB mode is recognisable, while
in CBC mode the image is not.
Figure 5.11 – AES encrypting a colour image in ECB and CBC modes
(a) (b) (c)
The images of Lena and of the penguin used in this test are smaller than the original
ones (Figure 5.2a and 5.2b). They were resized because the adopted SRAM was size
limited, and only images up to 12 MB size could be loaded.
5.1.3 ASIC results
Celator performances for the AES algorithm are given thereafter and compared with
the performances of other cryptographic structures. We chose to compare Celator with
GPPs and AES dedicated hardwired macros. The GPPs are ARM7TDMI (32-bits)
[41], ARM9 (32-bits) [43] and AVR (8-bits). The AES dedicated hardware macros are
the Atmel SOMA AES (AT91S0100 [44]), the Helion Standard AES cores [45], and the
architectures presented in [32], [46], [47]. Moreover, Celator is also compared with a
dynamically reconfigurable architecture called PiCoGa [48].
The whole computer system presented in Figure 4.3, i.e. Celator, the ARM7TDMI
and some other peripherals, were synthesized by Synopsys Design Compiler with Atmel
Standard Cells resources and the 130 nm technology. These same tools were also used
to determine the ASIC areas of SOMA and of AVR microprocessors. Results are shown
and commented below.
The version of Celator presented here needs 570 clock cycles and performs at
43 Mbps to encrypt an AES 128-bit data block in ECB mode. In CBC mode an
AES 128-bit data block is encrypted in 580 clock cycles and performed at 42 Mbps.
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Even though a dedicated hardware macro is faster than our solution (the AES hard-
ware macro of Atmel SOMA takes 40 cycles, i.e. a cycle for each AES transformation),
it needs a larger area. GPPs such as the ARM7TDMI and ARM9 processors are larger
and slower than Celator. The GPP AVR has the same size but it is slower than Celator.
Comparisons between Celator and hardwired macros and GPP are given in Table 5.1.
This table does not show the size of RAM and caches. The CRAM area is 1mm2 in
130nm Atmel technology.
Table 5.1 – Comparisons of areas and performances for encrypting an AES
128-bit data block in CBC mode. Note that RAM and Cache sizes are
not taken into account.
cycles Max Freq. Area Bit-rate Techno.
(# of) (MHz) (mm2) (Mbps) (nm)
Atmel SOMA [44] 40 150 Atmel 480.0 130
Celator 580 190 Confidential 42.0 130
µ PiCoGa[48] 285 200 Atmel 90.0 90
µ AVR 5000 40 Confidential 1.0 130
µ ARM7TDMI [41] 3600 65 Atmel 2.3 130
µ ARM9 [43] 830 200 Confidential 31.0 130
Dedicated hardware macros (Tables 5.1 and 5.2) such as Mangard, Satoh, Sharma
and Atmel SOMA AES have a higher bit-rate (bit per second) than Celator but un-
like Celator they are not reconfigurable. A dynamically reconfigurable architecture
such as PiCoGa [48] achieves a higher bit-rate than Celator but, even if PiCoGa is
reconfigurable, it is far larger than Celator.
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Table 5.2 – Throughput performances for encrypting an AES 128-bit data
block in ECB mode
Throughput
(bits per cycle)
µ AVR 0.024
µ ARM7TDMI [41] 0.036
Celator 0.224
Mangard Macro [47] 2.0
Satoh Macro [46] 2.37
Sharma Macro [32] 3.2
AES Macro of Atmel SOMA [44] 3.2
Figure 5.12 – Areas and Throughputs for AES-128 in CBC mode encrypting
of a special purpose macro (Atmel), of multi-algorithms proces-
sors (Celator and PiCoGa) and of general purpose processors
(AVR and ARM).
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To conclude this result section, Celator has a good percentage of reconfigurability
given by the portfolio of its instructions and proved by the implementation of other
algorithms (sections 5.2 and 5.3): the PE array data-path can be modified and up
to eight ALU operations can be selected. It also results clear that Celator represents
a good trade off among dedicated hardware macros (which are not reconfigurable),
the dynamically reconfigurable architecture as PiCoGa (which has a good percentage
of reconfigurability) and GPPs (which are fully programmable) in terms of areas and
throughput (Figure 5.12).
5.2 DES
Before detailing every step on how Celator can do the DES permutations, we must
consider that Celator is able to compute 32-bit word data (Figure 5.13). In fact, as
a single PE computes a 8-bit data (Figure 5.13a), four PE can be concatenated in
order to compute a 32-bit data. In this way, the PE array can be considered as four
32-bit data rows (Figure 5.13b). Moreover, as each PE includes two 8-bit registers, the
whole PE array can be considered as eight 32-bit registers, four Reg A and four Reg
B (Figure 5.13c).
5.2.1 Implementation of the DES into a PE Array – Confidential
This section is Atmel confidential.
5.2.2 FPGA results
Figures 5.14 show the image of Lena before (Figures 5.14a) and after DES encrypting
(Figures 5.14b) in ECB mode. The Celator dedicate assembler code for DES is annexed
(section C). Like in the Figure 5.8, the Lena’s profile is recognisable when encrypted
in ECB mode.
The schema followed for encrypting in ECB mode is the same used in Figure 5.8,
replacing the AES with the DES algorithm.
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Figure 5.13 – Considering the PE as eight 32-bit PE rows. In each PE row,
four PE can be concatenated and operate on 32-bit data; as each PE include
two registers (Reg A and Reg B), four PE can work on two 32-bit data
.
(a)
PE11 PE12 PE13 PE14
PE21 PE22 PE23 PE24
PE31 PE32 PE33 PE34
PE41 PE42 PE43 PE44
=⇒ (b)
PE1
PE2
PE3
PE4
=⇒
(c)
Reg A Reg B
Reg A Reg B
Reg A Reg B
Reg A Reg B
5.2.3 ASIC results
Celator performances for the DES algorithm are given thereafter and compared with
the performances of other cryptographic structures (Table 5.3). We chose to compare
Celator with a GPP and a DES dedicated hardwired macro. The GPP is the Alpha
processor [36]. The DES dedicated hardware macro is the Atmel DES macro. Moreover,
Celator is also compared with an efficient FPGA implementation [37].
Since Celator is reconfigurable, we do not need to modify its architecture in order to
encrypt a DES data block. Therefore, the same timing results presented in section 5.1.3
will be used here. Celator was synthesized by Synopsys Design Compiler with Atmel
Standard Cells resources and the 130 nm technology.
The version of Celator presented here needs 590 clock cycles to encrypt a DES
64-bit data block. It achieves 22 Mbps throughput when operated at 190 MHz. This
throughput is smaller than other circuits performances. The slowest operation in DES
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Figure 5.14 – DES: encrypting a colour image in ECB
(a) (b)
Celator implementation is the permutation. In DES there are up to 5 permutations,
and 3 of them are executed 16 times. A PE array like Celator seems to not be fully
suitable to execute these permutations, that are bitwise operations, and leaves most of
the PEs unused.
The software solution proposed in [36] operates on a 64-bit processor, which is very
suitable to manage 64-bit data block. These S-boxes are hardwired. Therefore this
solution is not fully reconfigurable, unlike Celator is.
The Atmel hardware macro needs 16 clock cycles to perform a DES encryption,
i.e. a cycle per DES round. This is one of the best throughput suitable for embedded
systems. Again, this solution is not reconfigurable, unlike Celator is.
The FPGA based solution is more then 12 times faster than Celator, thanks espe-
cially to its parallelized S-boxes.
Celator has a good percentage of reconfigurability given by the portfolio of its in-
structions and proved by the implementation of other algorithms (sections 5.1 and 5.3):
the PE array data-path can be modified and up to eight ALU operations can be se-
lected. Like AES execution, DES execution is slower on Celator than on dedicated
hardware macros. Unlike AES execution, DES execution is slower on Celator than on
hardware implementations in FPGA or on GPP.
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Table 5.3 – Comparisons of areas and performances for encrypting a DES
64-bit data block in EBC mode.
Type Cycles Frequency Bit-rate
(# of) (MHz) (Mbps)
Atmel HW 16 100 400
Saqib [37] FPGA – – 274
Ebiham 1 [36] SW 140 300 167
Ebiham 2 [36] SW 417 300 46
Celator HW/SW 590 190 22
5.3 SHA
We implemented the SHA-256. The input block for a such hashing algorithm is 512
bits, while the output digest is over 256 bits. In the SHA-256 main loop eight 32-bit
variables are used. As the whole PE array can compute up to four 32-bit values at
once, Celator compute the eight SHA variables in 2 times.
5.3.1 Implementation of the SHA into a PE Array – Confidential
This section is Atmel confidential.
5.3.2 FPGA results
Celator was programmed to operate a SHA on Lena image (Figure 5.15). The Celator
dedicate assembler code for SHA is annexed (section D).
The SHA output of Figure 5.15 is the following eight 32-bit words (hexadecimal
format):
D0E309A7 88BE2E1B 255BEE42 B18B0675 174E1E05 69063F30 D748EEF4 F236D21D
After changing a single pixel on the original image, which is unrecognisable by the
naked human eye (Figure 5.15b), the SHA output is:
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Figure 5.15 – The versions of Lena image. The original image is (a), in (b) one
pixel is changed
(a) (b)
38F26C9A B2DC15A3 845E6AAD 6B94495C 9747FE14 86E513D1 D2FD2CE7 BDA331C3
The digest of Figure 5.15a is totally different of the 5.15b.
5.3.3 ASIC results
Celator performances for the SHA algorithm are given thereafter and compared with
the performances of other cryptographic structures (Table 5.4). We chose to compare
Celator with some SHA dedicated hardwired macros. The SHA dedicated hardware
macros are the macros presented in [39], [38] and [40].
Since Celator is reconfigurable, we do not need to modify Celator architecture in
order to encrypt a SHA data block. Moreover, the same timing results presented in
section 5.1.3 will be used here. Celator was synthesized by Synopsys Design Compiler
with Atmel Standard Cells resources and the 130 nm technology.
The version of Celator presented here needs 6000 clock cycles to hash a SHA 256-bit
data block. It achieves 16 Mbps throughput when operated at 190 MHz. With some
slight hardware modifications, which are already under study, Celator can hash a SHA
256-bit data block with an estimated 46 Mbps throughput. This throughput is smaller
than other circuits performances. The slowest operations in SHA Celator implementa-
tion are the data transfers among all registers that store the SHA values (SHA values
are eight 32-bit registers). In order to speed up the data transfers, thus the SHA ex-
ecution, some local memory blocks must be included in the Celator implementation
(other than the CRAM).
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Table 5.4 – Comparisons of areas and performances for hashing 512-bit data
block, according to SHA-256.
Type Cycles Frequency Bit-rate
(# of) (MHz) (Mbps)
Rchaves [39] HW 65 – 1400
Iahmad [38] HW – – 1000
Cadence datasheet [40] HW 70 133 971
Celator HW/SW 6000 190 16
Like for AES and DES execution, the SHA execution is slower in Celator than
in dedicated hardware macros. But dedicated macros are not reconfigurable, unlike
Celator is. Celator has a good percentage of reconfigurability given by the portfolio
of its instructions and proved by the implementation of other algorithms (sections 5.2
and 5.3): the PE array data-path can be modified and up to eight ALU operations can
be selected.
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Conclusions and Further Work
This thesis describes an original implementation of a multi-algorithm Crypto-Co-
Processor called Celator. Celator can perform the AES, DES and SHA algorithms.
Celator is aimed to be integrated in an ASIC for embedded circuits by using Atmel
Standard Cells, and it can be included in a Smart Card or in a Smart Card Reader. We
propose the systolic architecture to make Celator reconfigurable, which is a novelty, at
our knowledge, for cryptographic applications. Usually FPGA techniques are adopted
to make a device reconfigurable [49]. However, our reconfigurable solution is FPGA
less. The developed Celator processor has a degree of reconfigurability. We found a
reconfigurable technology by using a systolic processor based on a Processing Element
(PE) array.
In chapter 1 we have presented a brief history of the security. Confidential data
have to be hidden, or encrypted, in order to ensure the people privacy (ID), and to
allow the people to access to a required service (communications, electronic payment,
TV on demand et cetera). Thus we need secure products. But these products must be
protected against side channel attacks, otherwise the protection they are supposed to
offer is leaked. Side channel attacks is one example of threats that must be countered.
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Another big family is the fault injection, which can be very powerful for an attacker
too.
In chapter 2 we have seen three algorithms that we have executed on Celator: AES,
DES, and SHA algorithm. AES and DES are used to encrypt/decrypt a message by
private keys, while SHA is used to hash a message. These algorithms are largely used
in most of the nowadays secure products.
In chapter 3 we have described some hardware and software implementations of
cryptographic algorithms. The execution on GPP is slower than on hardwired macros,
but hardwired macros are larger in terms of equivalent gates. Hardwired macros are
not reconfigurable unlike GPP. For us, the good trade off choice is a solution “in the
middle”, between GPP and hardwire macros. Celator performances are situated among
those of dedicated hardware macros and those of GPPs.
In chapter 4 we have presented Celator. Celator is made of 16 Processing Elements
arranged in a systolic fashion (PE array), of a local RAM (the CRAM) and of a
Controller, which includes an FSM. The FSM reads the instructions in the CRAM, and
the PE array executes them under the control of the FSM. Celator can be reconfigured
by the CPU. Given its structure based on a PE array, all matrix format data can be
easily computed.
In chapter 5 we have described how Celator can be reprogrammed in order to
execute AES, DES and SHA algorithm. We have shown how Celator can operate on
32-bit, 8-bit and 1-bit data words. We have prototyped Celator on a Xilinx FPGA
card to test it. Celator has been synthesized and placed and routed for an ASIC with
Atmel Standard Cells. Results show how Celator is a good trade off choice of crypto-
processor with respect to the number of gates, the number of execution cycles and the
reconfigurability.
In this thesis the security aspects are not fully analysed. We consider “writing” or
“reading” operations into/from a register or the CRAM as trusted operations. Given
the structure of Celator, during the encrypting or decrypting operations, data can be
masked; for instance data can be xored once or several times with random data in order
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to become more difficult to be intercepted by hackers through Side Channel Attacks
(SCA) [50], [51]. Furthermore, several nop operations can be added to certain Celator
programs, in order to have the same execution time for all algorithms performed by
Celator. In this way, Celator would be timing attack resistant.
Celator will be included in the next generation of Atmel Smart Card Readers. Re-
cent studies show how Celator performances can be improved with a slight modification
of its architecture. Celine Huynh Van Thieng [52] is currently developing a combinato-
rial block in the PE array, which is dedicated to the bit permutations on 32-bit words
based based on omega–flip networks [53]. She is also allowing the FSM to access the
CRAM by both ports. In this way, the execution of the AES, DES and SHA in Celator
is speeded up. The cost of these modifications is to add 10% of the equivalent gates
only. Thus, the AES execution can be reduced to 510 clock cycles only. The DES
execution can be reduced to 470 clock cycles only: the DES permutations benefit from
the permutation-dedicated block. The SHA execution can be reduced to 3700 clock
cycles only: in the legacy SHA implementation there are many data transfers from/to
the CRAM, which are speeded up by the new access to the CRAM.
As further work on Celator, we will improve the security against all SCA, and we
will study the implementation of other algorithms in Celator. Thanks to its generic
structure and its generic instruction set, Celator can be multi-algorithms. According
to the Atmel strategy, Celator can be required to obtain an EAL evaluation. If so,
a Protection Profile will be written in order to fit the EAL5+ specific requirements.
Another main point of the further work will be to study and develop a trusted platform
to secure exchanges of data between the CPU and Celator, as well as between the CPU
and an external data source.
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Re´sume´ en langue franc¸aise
de la the`se intitule´e ”Design
and development of a
reconfigurable cryptographic
co-processor” par Daniele
Fronte
Ce chapitre re´sume ma the`se en langue franc¸aise.
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7.1 Re´sume´
Les circuits a` haute technologie d’aujourd’hui requie`rent toujours plus de services et
de se´curite´. Le marche´ correspondant est oriente´ vers de la reconfigurabilite´. Dans
cette the`se je propose une nouvelle solution de coprocesseur cryptographique multi-
algorithmes, appele´ Celator. Celator est capable de crypter et de´crypter des blocs
de donne´es en utilisant des algorithmes cryptographiques a` cle´ syme´trique tel que
l’Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1] ou le Data Encryption Standard (DES) [2].
De plus, Celator permet de hacher des donne´es en utilisant le Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA) [3]. Ces algorithmes sont imple´mente´s de fac¸on mate´rielle ou logicielle dans les
produits se´curise´s. Celator appartient a` la classe des imple´mentations mate´rielles flexi-
bles, et permet a` son utilisateur d’exe´cuter des algorithmes cryptographiques standards
ou proprie´taires.
L’architecture de Celator est base´e sur un re´seau systolique de 4x4 Processing Ele-
ments, nomme´ re´seau de PE, commande´ par un Controˆleur re´alise´ par avec une Machine
d’E´tats Finis (FSM) et une me´moire locale.
Cette the`se pre´sente l’architecture de Celator, ainsi que les ope´rations de base
ne´cessaires pour qu’il exe´cute AES, DES et SHA. Les performances de Celator sont
e´galement pre´sente´es, et compare´es a` celles d’autres circuits se´curise´s.
7.2 Introduction
La tendance du marche´ des produits se´curise´s est d’offrir plus de services et se´curite´ aux
utilisateurs. Il se peut qu’un dispositif e´lectronique doive exe´cuter des algorithmes pour
lesquels il n’avait pas e´te´ conc¸u. Notre challenge est l’imple´mentation d’un coprocesseur
cryptographique multi-algorithmes, appele´ Celator. Celator est conc¸u pour eˆtre inte´gre´
dans un ASIC pour circuits embarque´s, re´alise´s par des cellules standards de la socie´te´
Atmel. Plus pre´cise´ment, Celator doit eˆtre inclus dans des cartes a` puce et dans des
lecteurs de cartes a` puce.
Re´sume´ en langue franc¸aise de la the`se
En utilisant des ope´rations logiques et arithme´tiques de base, Celator est capable
d’exe´cuter les algorithmes suivants:
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128, AES-196 et AES-256), [1]
• Data Encryption Standard (DES), [2]
• Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA-256), [3]
La solution que nous avons adopte´e pour Celator est base´e sur un re´seau systolique a`
maille carre´e de 4x4 Processing Elements, nomme´ re´seau de PE. Le chemin de donne´es
du re´seau de PE ainsi que la Machine d’Etats Finis sont reconfigurables.
Le reste de ce chapitre est organise´ comme suit. Le paragraphe 3 introduit les
algorithmes exe´cute´s par Celator. Le paragraphe 4 pre´sente l’architecture mate´rielle
de Celator. Le paragraphe 5 montre les re´sultats de validation sur FPGA, et e´galement
les re´sultats de validation ASIC de Celator. Dans le paragraphe 5 je donnerai des
conclusions sur Celator.
7.3 Trois algorithmes cryptographiques
Ce paragraphe introduit brie`vement les trois algorithmes qui ont e´te´ imple´mente´s dans
Celator: AES, DES et SHA. Le lecteur peut trouver une description comple`te de ces
algorithmes dans [1, 2, 3].
7.3.1 L’algorithme AES
L’Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) est un algorithme de cryptage et de´cryptage a`
cle´ prive´e, approuve´ comme standard par le Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS). C’est le successeur de DES de´crit dans le paragraphe suivant. Cependant, DES
est encore de nos jours tre`s demande´ par les utilisateurs. L’AES existe en trois versions
AES-128, AES-196 et AES-256, dans lesquelles la cle´s initiale est code´e sur 128, 192 et
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256 bits. Dans les trois versions, l’AES crypte ou de´crypte des messages par blocs de
128 bits. Dans cette the`se, nos e´tudes se sont porte´s sur l’AES-128
Chaque bloc de donne´es peut eˆtre ge´re´ comme une matrice de 4x4 octets (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 – La matrice de 4x4 octets pour un bloc de donne´es AES-128.
d11 d12 d13 d14
d21 d22 d23 d24
d31 d32 d33 d34
d41 d42 d43 d44
Le proce´de´ de cryptage AES inclut 10 boucles. Chaque boucle (a` l’exception de la
premie`re et de la dernie`re) comporte les transformations suivantes :
1. Sub-Bytes
2. Shift-Rows
3. Mix-Columns
4. Add-Round-Key
7.3.2 L’algorithme DES
L’algorithme Data Encryption Standard est un algorithme de cryptage et de de´cryptage
a` cle´ prive´e, constitue´ d’une permutation initiale IP, de 16 boucles de transformations,
et d’une permutation finale IP−1. Dans chaque boucle, une ope´ration “ou exclusif”,
une fonction f, ainsi que deux permutations sont exe´cute´es : PC1, PC2. La fonction f
inclut l’expansion E, la permutation P et huit substitutions S. Contrairement a` AES,
les permutations de DES se font bit a` bit. Leur exe´cution par Celator, qui travaille
sur des mots d’un octet, montre comment Celator peut travailler avec un format de
donne´es d’un bit.
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7.3.3 L’algorithme SHA
Le SHA-1 et le SHA-2 (c’est-a`-dire SHA-256, SHA-384, et SHA-512) sont quatre Secure
Hash Algorithms spe´cifie´s par [3]. Ces algorithmes sont ite´ratifs, repre´sentent des
fonctions de hachage a` une direction (one-way hash functions) qui peuvent traiter un
message pour produire un condense´ appele´ hache´ (ou digest en anglais).
Chaque algorithme peut eˆtre de´crit en deux e´tapes : d’abord le pre´traitement,
puis le calcul du condense´. Le pre´traitement implique le remplissage d’un message
(padding), la de´composition de ce message formate´ en plusieurs blocs de m bits (m= 512
pour SHA-1 et SHA-256, m= 1024 pour SHA-384 et SHA-512), et l’initialisation de
valeurs qui seront ensuite utilise´es dans le calcul du condense´. Le calcul du condense´
ge´ne`re une liste de messages a` partir du message rempli et utilise cette liste, a` travers
des fonctions, constantes, et ope´rations sur des mots pour ge´ne´rer ite´rativement une
se´rie de valeurs hache´es. La valeur finale du condense´ ge´ne´re´ par ce calcul est utilise´e
pour de´terminer le message hache´.
Comme de´crit dans [3], 8 variables interme´diaires de 32 bits (a, b, c, . . . , g, h) sont
ne´cessaires pour le calcul de SHA. Ces variables sont initialise´es par 8 constantes 32
bits donne´es par le standard (H1, H2, . . . , H8).
7.4 Imple´mentations mate´rielles et logicielles d’algorithmes cryp-
tographiques : e´tat de l’art
Les algorithmes cryptographiques peuvent eˆtre exe´cute´s sur des processeurs a` usage
ge´ne´rique (GPP, de l’anglais General Purpose Processor), ou sur des dispositifs de´die´s,
comme les macros mate´rielles. Ge´ne´ralement, les macros mate´rielles ont de meilleures
performances que les GPP, mais les GPP sont reconfigurables a` 100%, alors que les
macros sont de´die´s et donc pas reconfigurables.
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7.4.1 Le NEC DRP
Un processeur dynamiquement reconfigurable (DRP) a e´te´ de´crit par NEC dans [54]. Le
DRP est compose´ d’un re´seau a` 2 dimensions fait de plusieurs Processeurs E´le´mentaires
(PE), une machine d’e´tats et d’e´le´ments de me´morisation. Un PE contient un banc de
registres, et une ALU. Avant de commencer un calcul, les chemins de donne´es et les
programmes de controˆle doivent eˆtre sauvegarde´s. A cette fin, un programme e´crit en
langage C est d’abord compile´, puis synthe´tise´ et ensuite te´le´charge´ dans le DRP.
Une telle architecture systolique se montre bien adapte´e pour des calculs en paralle`le
sur des donne´es sous format matriciel. Son point ne´gatif est le temps de compilation-
synthe`se-te´le´chargement du programme de controˆle. Si une architecture similaire est
pre´sente dans Celator, le temps de controˆle devra eˆtre minimise´.
7.4.2 La macro SHARMA
Dans [32] une architecture systolique est utilise´e pour construire un dispositif a` hautes
performances de´die´ a` AES, incluant une me´moire et un re´seau de PE. Les donne´es
circulent de la me´moire vers les PE pour ensuite retourner vers la me´moire.
Les quatre ope´rations d’AES sont re´alise´es de la fac¸on suivante :
1. Les transformations Sub-Bytes sont re´alise´es a` l’aide d’un bloc ASIC. Avec
quelques connexions, la meˆme structure peut eˆtre modifie´e et utilise´e tant en
cryptage qu’en de´cryptage.
2. Les transformations Shift-Rows ne demandent pas d’imple´mentations se´pare´es.
Les donne´es sont de´cale´es a` l’aide des registres R0–R5.
3. Pour les transformations Mix-Columns, une architecture systolique est utilise´e
pour effectuer la multiplication matricielle du re´seau 4x4
4. Dans les transformations Add-Round-Key, des portes combinatoires XOR sont
utilise´es.
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Une telle imple´mentation systolique requiert 40 cycles d’horloge pour crypter un
bloc de 128 bits avec AES, atteignant une vitesse the´orique d’exe´cution de 3,2 bits
par cycle. Sachant qu’une boucle AES comprend 4 transformations et qu’une boucle
est re´pe´te´e 10 fois par cryptage, alors chaque transformation est exe´cute´e en un cycle
d’horloge seulement. Cela repre´sente un re´sultat excellent.
Le de´savantage d’une telle macro est la non reconfigurabilite´ : elle est capable
d’exe´cuter un seul algorithme, AES dans ce cas. Ne´anmoins, l’approche systolique
se montre un bon candidat pour crypter/de´crypter des donne´es en format matriciel.
Notre solution de coprocesseur doit ame´liorer cette ide´e afin d’obtenir un circuit inte´gre´
reprogrammable et multi-algorithmes.
7.5 L’architecture mate´rielle de Celator
Dans cette section nous allons illustrer le de´veloppement de Celator et l’architecture
du syste`me dans lequel s’inse`re Celator. Le syste`me conside´re´ (Fig. 7.1) comprend
une CPU base´e sur un processeur ARM, une me´moire centrale, Celator et d’autres
pe´riphe´riques.
Figure 7.1 – Syste`me complet incluant Celator
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Celator comprend un re´seau de PE, un controˆleur, et une me´moire propre a` Celator,
appele´e CRAM. Les Processeurs E´le´mentaires sont les blocs de base a` partir desquels le
re´seau de PE est construit. Celator peut avoir une horloge de fonctionnement diffe´rente
du CPU. L’unite´ IF assure la communication entre Celator et le CPU.
7.5.1 Le re´seau de PE
Le re´seau de PE (Fig. 7.1) est compose´ d’un re´seau 4x4 de Processeurs E´le´mentaires
(PE). Tous les PE sont identiques. Le re´seau de PE est controˆle´ par le Se´quenceur.
Le re´seau de PE a une structure d’entre´e/sortie a` deux dimensions (2D I/O). De
cette fac¸on, chaque PE (Fig. 7.3) a 4 entre´es donne´es, c’est-a`-dire une par chaque
direction cardinale : Nord, Sud, Ouest et Est. Chaque PE posse`de une sortie donne´e,
connecte´e a` l’entre´e donne´e de ses 4 PE voisins les plus proches. Dans un PE, toutes
les entre´es et sorties donne´es sont de 1 octet. Un PE inclut un registre 8 bit et une
ALU.
Figure 7.2 – L’architecture du re´seau de PE
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Figure 7.3 – Les entre´es/sorties du PU
Chaque PE rec¸oit des signaux de controˆle du Se´quenceur afin de traiter les donne´es.
Les signaux de controˆle peuvent :
1. charger les donne´es du PE nord, sud, ouest, est, la CRAM, le CPU, ou une source
exte´rieure ;
2. choisir quelle donne´e enregistrer entre la donne´e qui vient d’eˆtre calcule´e et la
donne´e en entre´e du PE ;
3. choisir la sortie donne´e du PE entre la donne´e pre´ce´demment enregistre´e et la
donne´e qui vient d’eˆtre e´labore´e ;
4. choisir une des ope´rations de l’ALU ;
5. lire/e´crire a` partir du PE ouest/nord et e´crire/lire dans les PE est/sud.
Un PE peut exe´cuter seulement une instruction par cycle d’horloge.
L’ALU de chaque PE peut exe´cuter les ope´rations arithme´tiques et logique sur des
ope´randes de 8 bits : addition modulo 256, addition modulo 255, ou, ou exclusif, xtime,
et, inversion et non-ope´ration.
E´tant donne´ que les multiplexeurs des PE sont configure´s par la machine d’e´tats
(FSM) du Se´quenceur, et que cette configuration peut eˆtre modifie´e a` chaque cycle
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d’horloge, le chemin des donne´es du re´seau de PE est donc reconfigurable, tout comme
la FSM.
Nous avons choisi une granularite´ de PE sur 8 bits. De cette fac¸on, les registres
et l’ALU de chaque PE permettent de manipuler tre`s aise´ment des octets. Comme
nous le montrerons dans le paragraphe 6, le choix de ce format de donne´es pour le PE
permettra l’exe´cution d’algorithmes n’ayant pas le meˆme format de donne´es, tels que
DES et SHA.
Par exemple, comme chaque PE traite des mots de donne´es de 8 bits, alors une ligne
entie`re de PE peut traiter des mots de donne´es de 32 bits. Ainsi, le re´seau de PE peut
eˆtre conside´re´ comme travaillant sur quatre mots de donne´es de 32 bits. Cette proprie´te´
peut eˆtre exploite´e afin de re´soudre des algorithmes tels que SHA-256, qui ope`re sur
huit mots de donne´es de 32 bits. Les calculs du SHA-256 peuvent eˆtre exe´cute´s par
Celator en deux temps.
De plus, ce type d’architecture peut eˆtre aussi utile pour exe´cuter des algorithmes
tels que DES, parce que DES ope`re sur des mots de donne´es de 64 bit, qui est la taille
de 2 colonnes PE.
7.5.2 Le Se´quenceur
Le Se´quenceur ge´ne`re les signaux de controˆle pour le re´seau de PE et les instructions
pour le CPU. Aussi, il controˆle les entre´es et sorties donne´es du re´seau de PE. Le
Se´quenceur est compose´ d’une FSM et d’e´le´ments de stockage.
Les instructions de la FSM sont simples, et ne sont pas de´die´es a` AES. Il s’agit
d’instructions ge´ne´riques qui peuvent eˆtre re´utilise´es pour imple´menter d’autres algo-
rithmes. Par exemple, avec une seule instruction la FSM peut copier des donne´es de
la CRAM vers le re´seau de PE et vice-versa, avec un offset spe´cifique ou pas, ou peut
effectuer une rotation de donne´es dans le re´seau de PE. Les instructions de la FSM
sont enregistre´es dans la CRAM.
Re´sume´ en langue franc¸aise de la the`se
7.5.3 La CRAM
La me´moire RAM de Celator, ou CRAM, enregistre des mots de donne´es et
d’instructions sur 32 bits. Parmi les donne´es, on compte les donne´es d’entre´es/sorties
qui doivent eˆtre crypte´es ou de´crypte´es, ou bien les donne´es ne´cessaires au proce´de´ de
cryptage/de´cryptage, comme les Sbox pour AES. Parmi les programmes enregistre´s
dans la CRAM, on compte les instructions pour le Se´quenceur. La CRAM est une
RAM double port, ainsi le CPU et le Se´quenceur peuvent acce´der simultane´ment a` la
CRAM en mode lecture/e´criture.
7.6 Comment Celator exe´cute les algorithmes cryptographiques
7.6.1 Les transformations d’AES
Celator peut exe´cuter les 4 transformations demande´es par un cryptage, un de´cryptage
et la ge´ne´ration des clefs d’AES.
Le re´seau de PE travaille comme un processeur systolique de type Complex In-
struction Multiple Data (CIMD) [42]. La CRAM contient les instructions pour la
FSM. Ces instructions sont charge´es par la FSM et ensuite sont exe´cute´es par le re´seau
de PE. Le CPU charge d’abord l’algorithme cryptographique, par exemple l’AES, dans
la CRAM et ensuite le CPU de´marre Celator. Le CPU controˆle Celator via l’unite´
IF et peut modifier quelques instructions de la se´quence d’instructions de l’algorithme
cryptographique, ou bien se´lectionner un algorithme diffe´rent. Donc, le CPU peut
reconfigurer Celator.
Sub-Bytes : la table Sbox est enregistre´e dans la CRAM. La FSM du Controˆleur
fournit les signaux pour exe´cuter une “look-up table” de chaque octet de donne´e en-
registre´ dans chaque PE. Un registre de la FSM est utilise´.
Shift-Rows : chaque ligne du re´seau de PE est de´cale´ de 1, 2, ou 3 positions
respectivement pour les colonnes 1, 2 or 3.
Mix-Columns : l’ope´ration fondamentale de la transformation Mix-Columns est
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la multiplication S ′(x) = A(x) ∗ S(x).
Chaque octet de l’e´tat S(x) est multiplie´ par le vecteur polynomial A(x), comme
de´crit dans [1], par l’ope´ration xtime et ensuite xore´ par colonnes. Les deux ope´rateurs
xtime et xor sont pre´sents dans l’ALU.
Add-Round-Key : les clefs sont charge´es a` partir de la CRAM dans le re´seau de
PE et ensuite ”xore´es” avec les donne´es du re´seau.
7.6.2 Les transformations de DES
Les permutations de DES peuvent eˆtre exe´cute´es de la fac¸on suivante. Le mot a`
permuter A = a1 . . . a64 est multiplie´ par une matrice identite´. Du moment que les ai
sont des e´le´ments binaires, le re´sultat de la multiplication sera constitue´ de 64 lignes
avec un seul “1” et soixante “0”. Ensuite ces mots sont rote´es, et xore´s entre eux.
Comme un seul PE traite des donne´es de 8 bits, quatre PE peuvent eˆtre concate´ne´s
afin de traiter des donne´es sur 32 bits. Ainsi, le re´seau de PE peut eˆtre conside´re´
comme un ensemble de quatre lignes de PE de 32 bits chacune. Afin d’exe´cuter DES,
2 lignes de 4 PE chacune peuvent eˆtre utilise´es pour traiter un bloc de donne´es de 64
bits.
Les substitutions S de DES sont exe´cute´es comme les transformations Sub-Bytes
de AES.
7.6.3 Les transformations de SHA-256
Nous supposons que le pre´traitement des donne´es en entre´e est re´alise´ par le
CPU, et que Celator traite le calcul du condense´ seulement. Nous allons de´tailler
l’imple´mentation du calcul du condense´ de SHA-256.
Comme de´crit dans [3], les variables requises pour l’exe´cution de SHA sont les
suivantes :
1. 8 variables interme´diaires de 32 bits (a, b, c . . . g, h);
2. 48 variables 32 bits Wj;
Re´sume´ en langue franc¸aise de la the`se
3. 8 variables 32 bits : T1, T2, Ch,Maj,Σ0,Σ1, σ0, σ1, ROTR;
4. Le re´sultat est HN = (Hn1, Hn2, . . . , Hn8), c’est-a`-dire 8 variables 32 bits;
Comme pour DES, plusieurs PE sont utilise´s pour traiter les variables du calcul du
condense´. Dans le cas de SHA-256, quatre PE sont concate´ne´s pour traiter des mots
de 32 bits.
7.6.4 Modes ECB et CBC
Celator est capable de crypter et de´crypter un bloc de donne´es AES et DES en mode
Electronic Codebook (ECB) et en mode Cipher Bloc Chaining (CBC) [30]. La Fig. 7.4
montre la diffe´rence entre le cryptage AES d’une image en noir et blanc ([55], Fig. 7.4a)
en mode ECB (Fig. 7.4b) et en mode CBC (Fig. 7.4c).
Figure 7.4 – Cryptages AES en modes ECB et CBC
(a) (b) (c)
7.7 Re´sultats et discussions
Dans cette section nous de´taillons les performances de Celator et nous les comparons
aux performances d’autres dispositifs cryptographiques. Nous avons choisi de comparer
Celator a` des GPP [56, 41, 57], a` des macros mate´rielles de´die´es [44, 37, 36] et aussi a`
une architecture dynamiquement reconfigurable [48].
Le syste`me complet place´ autour de Celator est pre´sente´ dans la Fig. 7.1. Ce
syste`me a e´te´ de´veloppe´ en Verilog au niveau RTL (Register Transfer Level), simule´
par Mentor ModelSim synthe´tise´ par Synopsys DC avec des ressources Standard Cells
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d’Atmel, avec une technologie de 130 nm (longueur du canal du transistor). Ces meˆmes
outils ont e´te´ utilise´s pour de´terminer les surfaces ASIC des microprocesseurs Atmel
et AVR. Les re´sultats correspondants sont montre´s et commente´s plus bas.
La version de Celator pre´sente´e ici requiert 514 cycles d’horloge pour crypter un
bloc de donne´es par AES de 128 bit, avec un de´bit de 47 Mbps en mode ECB. En mode
CBC, le meˆme bloc est crypte´ en 524 cycles d’horloge, soit 46 Mbps (Table 7.2). Meˆme
si une macro mate´rielle de´die´e est plus rapide que notre solution (la macro mate´rielle
AES d’Atmel prend 40 cycles, c’est-a`-dire un cycle pour chaque transformation AES),
elle a besoin d’une surface plus importante. Les GPP tels qu’ARM 7 TDMI et ARM 9
occupent une superficie plus importante et sont plus lents que Celator. Le GPP AVR
a la meˆme taille mais il est plus lent que Celator.
Table 7.2 – Comparaison des surfaces et des de´bits (AES en mode CBC)
entre macros de´die´es, macros reconfigurables et GPP
cycles Max Freq. Area Bit-rate Techno.
(# of) (MHz) (mm2) (Mbps) (nm)
Atmel SOMA [44] 40 150 0.2 480.0 130
Celator 580 190 0.1 42.0 130
µ PiCoGa[48] 285 200 11.0 90.0 90
µ AVR 5000 40 0.1 1.0 130
µ ARM7TDMI [41] 3600 65 0.4 2.3 130
µ ARM9 [43] 830 200 1.1 31.0 130
Les macros pre´sente´es dans [47], et [46, 32] ont des performances (exprime´es en bits
par cycle) infe´rieures ou e´gales a` celles des macros comme Atmel [44], c’est-a`-dire 3.2
bits par cycle pour crypter un bloc de donne´es AES de 128 bits en mode ECB.
Les macros mate´rielles de´die´es (Table 7.2) ont un de´bit plus e´leve´ (en bit par sec-
onde) que Celator mais, contrairement a` Celator, elles ne sont pas reconfigurables. Une
architecture dynamiquement reconfigurable tel que PiCoGa [48] a un de´bit plus e´leve´
Re´sume´ en langue franc¸aise de la the`se
que Celator mais, meˆme si PiCoGa est reconfigurable, sa surface est beaucoup plus
importante.
Figure 7.5 – Surface et de´bits pour des cryptages AES-128 en mode CBC de
macros de´die´es, de processeurs multi-algorithmes et de GPP
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E´tant donne´ que Celator est reconfigurable, nous n’avons pas besoin de modifier
son architecture afin de crypter un bloc de donne´es DES.
Celator a besoin de 476 cycles d’horloge pour crypter un bloc de donne´es DES de
64 bit. Il re´alise un de´bit de 26 Mbps avec une fre´quence de fonctionnement de 190
MHz.
Ce de´bit est plus faible que celui d’autres circuits (Table 7.3). Pour DES,
l’ope´ration la plus lente dans l’imple´mentation de DES dans Celator est la permu-
tation. L’algorithme DES comporte 5 permutations, et 3 d’entre elles sont exe´cute´es
16 fois. Un re´seau de PE comme Celator ne semble pas pleinement ade´quat a` exe´cuter
ces permutations, car il s’agit d’ope´rations bit a` bit qui laissent la plupart des PEs non
utilise´s.
La solution logicielle propose´e dans [36] utilise un processeur 64 bit, qui est tre`s
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utile pour manipuler des blocs de donne´es 64 bit. Les tables S-boxes sont caˆble´es en
dur, donc cette solution, a` la diffe´rence de Celator, n’est pas pleinement reconfigurable.
La macro mate´rielle d’Atmel requiert 16 cycles d’horloge pour exe´cuter un cryptage
DES. Celle-ci est l’un des meilleurs de´bits dans des cartes a` puce. Encore une fois, cette
solution, a` la diffe´rence de Celator, n’est pas reconfigurable.
Table 7.3 – Comparaison des performances pour le cryptage d’un bloc de
donne´es DES 64 bits en mode EBC
Type Cycles Frequency Bit-rate
(# of) (MHz) (Mbps)
Atmel HW 16 100 400
Saqib [37] FPGA – – 274
Ebiham 1 [36] SW 140 300 167
Ebiham 2 [36] SW 417 300 46
Celator HW/SW 590 190 22
La solution base´e sur l’utilisation d’une carte FPGA a un de´bit e´leve´, graˆce surtout
a` ses S-boxes paralle`les.
Celator requiert 2720 cycles d’horloge pour condenser un bloc de donne´es de 512
bits, en utilisant l’algorithme SHA-256. Il atteint un de´bit de 36 Mbps avec une
fre´quence de fonctionnement de 190 MHz.
Ce de´bit est plus petit que les de´bits des autres circuits (Table 7.4). Les ope´rations
plus lentes dans l’imple´mentation SHA de Celator sont les transferts de donne´es entre
tous les registres qui contiennent les variables utilise´es dans SHA (il s’agit de 8 registres
32 bits). Afin d’acce´le´rer ces transferts de donne´es, et par conse´quent l’exe´cution de
SHA, quelques e´le´ments de me´moire doivent eˆtre inclus dans Celator (outre la CRAM).
Pour conclure, nous pouvons dire que Celator a un bon pourcentage de reconfig-
urabilite´ fournie par le portfolio de ses instructions, qui peuvent modifier le chemin des
donne´es du re´seau de PE et se´lectionner jusqu’a` 8 ope´rations de l’ALU.
Re´sume´ en langue franc¸aise de la the`se
Table 7.4 – Comparaison des performances pour condenser un bloc de
donne´es de 512 bits, en utilisant l’algorithme SHA-256
Type Cycles Frequency Bit-rate
(# of) (MHz) (Mbps)
Rchaves [39] HW 65 – 1400
Iahmad [38] HW – – 1000
Cadence datasheet [40] HW 70 133 971
Celator HW/SW 6000 190 16
Il re´sulte aussi clairement que Celator repre´sente un bon compromis entre les macros
mate´rielles de´die´es (qui ne sont pas programmables), les architectures dynamiquement
reconfigurables (qui ont un bon pourcentage de programmibilite) et les GPP (qui sont
pleinement programmables) en termes de surfaces, de´bit et flexibilite´ (Fig. 7.5).
7.8 Conclusions
Le coprocesseur cryptographique multi-algorithmes nomme´ Celator est pre´sente´ dans
cette the`se. Celator peut exe´cuter les algorithmes AES, DES et SHA-256. Il est
compose´ de 16 Processeurs E´le´mentaires (PE) dispose´s en re´seau systolique (re´seau
de PE), d’une me´moire RAM locale (la CRAM) et d’un Controˆleur (qui inclut une
FSM). La FSM lit les instructions dans la CRAM, et le re´seau de PE les exe´cute
sous le controˆle de la FSM. Celator peut eˆtre programme´ par le CPU. Graˆce a` sa
structure base´e sur un re´seau de PE, toutes les donne´es sous format matriciel peuvent
eˆtre facilement traite´es.
Celator est un bon compromis de crypto-coprocesseur par rapport au nombre de
portes e´quivalentes, au nombre de cycles d’exe´cution et au pourcentage de programma-
bilite´. Les performances de Celator se situent entre celles de macros mate´rielles de´die´es
et celles des GPP.
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Dans cette the`se, les aspects se´curitaires n’ont pas e´te´ analyse´s. Nous conside´rons
les ope´rations d’e´criture ou de lecture dans les registres ou dans la CRAM comme des
ope´rations suˆres. Graˆce a` la structure de Celator, pendant les proce`s de cryptage ou
de´cryptage, les donne´es peuvent eˆtre masque´es : par exemple, les donne´es peuvent
eˆtre ”xore´es” une ou plusieurs fois avec des variables ale´atoires, afin de les rendre plus
difficilement interceptables par des personnes malveillantes, par des attaques de type
Side Channel Attacks [50, 51].
Le prochain pas de nos investigations sera l’imple´mentation d’autres algorithmes
dans Celator. L’ architecture du re´seau de PE sera peut-eˆtre modifie´e, mais sa surface
ne sera pas affecte´e de manie`re conside´rable, graˆce surtout a` sa structure et a` son jeu
d’instruction ge´ne´riques.
Notre objectif a` long terme sera l’e´tude et le de´veloppement de plateformes suˆres
pour se´curiser les e´changes de donne´es entre le CPU et Celator, ainsi que entre le CPU
et des sources de donne´es externes.
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